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This dissertation concerns itself with three texts 
by Roland Barthes, namely The Pleasure of the Text, 
Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes and A Lover's Dis­
course, as well as a fourth one by Georges Bataille, 
ie. Story of the Eye. These three texts are unusual 
in that bhey deviate from the traditional language 
in which literary tneory has been presented, but this 
is in accordance with a general post-structuralist 
tendency towards new and paradoxical forms of dis­
course.
Various concepts are to be found in these three 
texts, deriving from semiology, psychoanalysis, 
as well as Nietzsche; by being used in another 
context they are partly transformed. The important 
notion cf pleasure holds a radical possibility for 
textual theory in that it provides for a type of 
textual production that proceeds from a sensuaJ or 
erotic experience of texts.
Love, like pleasure, is a theoretically disparaged 
term; the type of thought that employs such terms 
is productivist and non-humanist. Such thought dis­
places, rather than founds truths: in the textual 
domain it brings out the non-representational sensation 
of textuality, which has nothing to do with repre­
sentational eroticism, even in a text containing 
elements of the latter, such as Story of the Eye.
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1. Introduction
This study aims to elucidate three texts by Roland 
Barthes, namely The Pleasure of the Text , Roland  ^
Barthes by Roland Barthes z' and A hov^lgJilscQurse. . 
These texts differ in various respects from tne 
accepted or conventional form in which literary 
theory has been presented. They are aphoristic and 
make use of various devices usually associated with 
fiction, rather than theory, such as metaphor, juxta­
positions amounting to montage, stylistic variations, 
as well as interchanging of pronouns from "I" to 
"he" to "us", and the like. They also tend to be 
highly ambiguous in places, thereby lending the u 
selves to various and conflicting readings.
Such conflicting readings are exemplified by the 
fact that these texts are, on the one hand, quoted ^ 
in attempts to assimilate elements of them to Marxism., 
while on*the other end of the politico-literary spec- 
trum, they are as readily used by a right-wing litera­
tus who has been closely associated with South Africa's 
draconian censorship system'. Although literary theories 
are not necessarily bound to political positions on 
the left or the right, such utilisations of, speci­
fically, FT, to opposing ends", are indicative of the 
diverse appropriations in which the unusual and 
aphoristic form of these texts may result.
Such diverse appropriations may also include tee 
misrepresentation of the texts, and reduction of 
concepts in them, such as in the following example: 
"Barthes's literary theories often reflect 
ideas commonplace in Anglo-Saxon literary 
discourse since the 1920s... while his views 
on the Death of the Author are a repetition
in more grandiose terms of an attitude axiomatic 
in the American *Kew Critics‘ of the 19f0s and 
most elegantly expressed in the early essays 
of T.S. Eliot."1
To liken Barthes's theories to "New Criticism", as 
well as T.S. Eliot1s views on literature - which 
were primarily written apropos of ~ a°
Philip Thody does here, is an extraordinary act 
of theoretical reduction, for, ever since Writing 
Decree Zero^, Barthes has always kept his distance 
from the type of formalism that would regard the text 
as an isolated object whose intrinsic meanings aie 
to be ascertained by a given critical or "new criti­
cal" method.
In the case of Barthes's earlier texts, it would be 
quite easy to point out their difierence vis a vis 
New Criticism or to enunciate their specificity 
against any other misreading. But as regards these 
three "later" texts - they were all published within 
the past ten years, shortly beiore Barthes's death 
it is more difficult, precisely on account of their 
ambiguity and departure from a conventional theo­
retical language.
However, this departure is not unique to Barthes 
but relates to the development cl structuralist 
theories of literature into what has now become 
widely known as "post-structuralism". Tt is the 
hypothesis of this study that IT, KB and LB are 
to be regarded and read as post-structuxalist 
theoretical texts. .
The distinction between structuralism and post-struc­
turalism is not a hard and fast one. Even the more 
definite notion of the two, structuralism, has been 
defined variously, such as in this passage:
"Structuralism has been described as a method,
3a movement, an intellectual fad, and an .ideo­
logy. Each of these characterizations is in 
part valid. For structuralism is a loose, 
amorphous, many-faceted phenomenon with no 
clear lines of demarcation, no tightly knit 
group spearheading it, no specific set of 
doctrines held by all ♦lose whom one usually 
thinks of as being associated with it. It cuts 
across many disciplines - linguistics, anthro­
pology, literary criticism, psychology, philo­
sophy . *»10
This definition, like others, stresses the diversity 
of structuralism, or even structuralisms. However, 
because the specificity of any notion of post­
structuralism is immediately dependent on at least 
a clear and workable cicumscription of literary 
or ililosophico-literary structuralism, we need to 
be more precise.
Literary structuralism relates specifically to the 
development of tne linguistic tnecries of Ferdinand 
de Saussure in his famous Ccurs le linguistique
general? 11 towards a textual application, ie. as
a method of analysing texts. Although Saussure was 
the major precursor of literary structuralism, as well 
as semiology, which ne envisaged as a general albeit 
rigorous science of signs - attempts to distinguish be­
tween "semiology" and "semiotics" seem mostly inspired 
by a personal preference for the one or the other - there 
were inputs from other fields apart from linguistics. Of 
note are of course Claude Levi-Strausa who developed a 
structural anthropology that came to be very significant 
for the reading of texts, as well as the Russian-born
linguist, Roman Jakobson, who constructed a linguistically
12derived poetics . Various other authors, such as the
American linguist, C.S. Peirce, and the Russian Formal­
ists, contributed to structuralism. As we are not
- ----
;
■i
concerned here with the history of semiology or 
structuralism, but merely with its distinction vis 
a vis post-structuralism, we are citing the main 
historical structuralists by way of summary.
Saussure founded structuralism with his distinction 
between lanue and parole, or a generalised language 
system and actualised speech. Through this distinc­
tion, he provided for a type of analysis, or know­
ledge, or science, depending on how one wishes to 
define it, that would consist not in deducing from 
observable data, ie. the parole, but in the attempt 
to uncover intrinsic principles that make these 
concrete utterances possible. The lar,;;ue was in the 
first instance a system, an abstraction which con­
sisted of elements whose meaning was not defined 
by their content but by the structural relations 
between them. Saussure distinguished further between 
two types of structural relations, namely syntagmatic 
and as"ociat ive (later to be called paradipratio) 
ones. Thus the.meanings of what he called linguistic 
signs depended both on the syntagmatic relations 
of a given sign with other ones present in a certain 
structure, such as a sentence for example, and on 
associative relations with other signs that were 
not present.
In his notion of the Unguis ic sign, Saussure pro­
vided for different levels of structure, for the 
sign is composed of two elements, the siynifler 
and the si.mifled. At its most basic level, the 
signifier is the concrete phonic unit made up of 
a sound or sounds, whereas the signified is the 
meaning or concept attached to such a phonic unit.
Saussure's structural linguistics was synchronic, to 
use yet another important distinction that he made, 
ie. between the diachrvnir or historical study of
5.
language and the synchronic or simultaneous study of 
a present lan-.ue. It was also consciously scientific.
Although Saussure foresaw that his type of struc­
tural analysis could also be applied to other fields 
apart from language as such, the next generation of 
structuralists, of which Jakobson and l6vi-Strauss 
are perhaps the most wel)-known representatives, 
extended this type of analysis to anthropology and 
poetry, respectively. They too were concerned with 
founding sciences of anthropology and of literature.
Like I6vi-Strauss, Barthes too attained prominence
in the nineteen fifties and early sixties with the
J3publication of works such as Writing Degree Zero , 
Mythologies1 ,^ his Critical Issays1-3 and r'lernents 
of Semiology10. In these works he discussed Saussure 
and Jakobs on, and used a Saussurian type of structural 
analysis along with Marxist notions of class and 
ideology; a decade or two later he was to remark 
that tlie more he tried to displace the definition
of semiology, the more he became constituted as 
a representative of it1'.
Already in an essay published in 196418, Barthes 
anticipated the supercession of structuralism:
"And precisely because all thought about the 
historically intelligible is also a participation 
in that intelligibility, structural man is 
scarcely concerned to last; he knows that 
structuralism, too, is a certain form of the 
world, which will change with the world; just 
as he experiences his validity (but not his 
truth) in his power to speak the old languages 
of the world in a new way, so he knows that it 
will suffice that a new language rise out of 
history, a new language which speaks him in his 
turn, for his task to be done."1"
■
;
____________
6.
Such \ "new language", which M s  taken for its task
c. critique of the classical structuralist proposition 
uf Saussure, vakobson and 16vi-Strauss has indeed 
arisen, and in a variety of forms, This diverse 
collection of theories whose only common character­
istic- is a certain tangential relationship to struc- 
t ura■ism or aspects of structuralism, has become 
nown as post-structuralism, a problematically open 
that nonethe.ess conveys the openness of this 
r ••oblc ratio.
20. . , ,rL an attempt to define post-structuralism ,
h issue of the relation between structuralism 
n-structuralism succinctly when he speaks 
, cble; atics: one of delimitation, ie. where 
f the one and the beginning of the other 
s tuated, as well as the epistemoiogical issue 
, . rut and specificity of this transition. Although 
as net, due to the diversity of both struc- 
• . a post-structuralism, render any final
hese two problematics, he does suggest
" . . .m ; unda:.:enial difference between the
:t.u xu list and post-structuralist enterprises
; n r seen in tt.e shift from the problematic
■ th suby t to the deconstruction of. the
21nee pit of representation." 
a oncernwit. the synchronic analysis of struc-
, sr.ructura.Lism constituted an implicit problema- 
: i .. philosophies, theories or sciences that
•: ne themselves with the human subject, his 
usn ss, history and subjective relation to 
. bje x, which may be either the world or a field
i • uti- . h means by which structuralism made the
"dissolve" so to speak, was oasically the 
.0-. ‘ e linguistic sign as fprmulated by
r . ;..y encapsulating simultaneously a concrete 
x r  n r abstract signified, the sign made possible
7.
the fusion of reality and discourse. Everything, 
if not a language, could he analysed in the mannei 
of language. ?y according language and its science, 
linguistics, a primary position in the ordei o* 
discourse, all the sciences that hitherto took tne 
study of the human subject for their object, courd 
now be radically revised to make way for the struc­
tural science, and the analysis of structural relations
between linguistic, mythological, textual, Ij- : 1 -'
22signs and the like " .
If we are to accept Harari’s characterisation, 'im­
post-structuralist enterprise would consis of tuc 
dismantling of this central notion of the sign in 
structuralism and the critique oi its reprer. ; 
form, for in positing the simultaneity ot signify'-: 
and signified, the sign is inextricably caugnt 
as "sign of", a signifier that represents a signified, 
a process of signification that consists in a closed 
movement from representative to representa>. n. 
circumscribe post-structuralism as the deconstructicn 
of representation, as Barari does, entails tctij.:.. 
Jacques Derrida as the typical post-structnr-..-^. v 
figure'"* .
However, if we enumerate some well-known post-struc­
turalists, as they occ r in Barari"s pos^-structura..t 
anthology, as well as comparable expressly post- 
structuralist collections24, it would comprise the 
following names: Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan,
Michel Foucault, Paul de Man, Gilles Deleuze,
Kristeva, Edward Said, as well as the "later" Dart u.
A deconstruction of representation i. onlj vv 
indirectly attributable to the work of-some oi tnew, 
for their objects of study range from psychoanalysis 
to the history of confinement to Bietzsche to love, 
etc. Although all of them tend to undermine any for:., 
of representational thought in some way or anottn ,
there are other similarities which may be less 
dependent on a characterisation deriving from the 
work of one specific thinker, such as Berrioa.
Because of the relatively controversial form of these 
three texts by Barthes regarding that of conventional 
literary theory, inviting as they do to be read in 
a similarly piecemeal fashion to that in which they 
are written, theii relation to a general post-struc­
turalist tendency needs to be stressed in this intro­
duction.
Generally speaking, post-structuralism could be 
defined by the following attributes: (1) use of 
structuralist concepts in a displaced way; (2 ) a 
critical attitude towards science and scientific truth; 
(3 ) the negation of conventional authorship; (4) 
theory as auto-critique; (5 ) dismissal of metalanguage 
and (6 ) the conception of language as heterogeneous 
plurality.
Some of these attributes could of course be character­
istic of other theoretical writings such as, for 
example, the work of renegade philosopher of science, 
Paul Peyerabend, who through his iconoclastic theo­
risation of paradigm incommensurability, has also 
dealt the death-knell to any notion of a metalanguage 
or progress in knowledge^"3. Altb.ugh he does not 
engage in verbal ambiguity in the way of a Lacan 
or Derrida, through his wildly humorous and sarcastic 
style he, however, deviates at least as recognisabiy 
from the accepted language of philosophical theory.
But Fcyerabend nonetheless, through the strategic 
force of his texts which is directed at Popperian 
critical rationalism, belongs to the tradition of 
Anglo-American philosophy of science as its negative 
counterpart.
In the same way, post-structuralism is a type of
negative structuralism. Whereas Saussure founded 
a science with his distinction between signifier 
and signified, Derrida opens up ar. anti-metaphysics 
with his notion of a signifier of a signifier.
To elaborate on the six points mentioned above:
(1) by using the Saussurian signifier in this way 
not within a scientific semiology but an anti-meta­
physical and anti-scientific "grammatblogy"^, the 
concept of signifier is displaced, which is to say 
that although it is altered by being used in an 
entirely new domain, its new meaning in some sense 
still partly derives from the old domain.
(2) All post-structuralist writings display a very 
critical attituae towards science and scientific 
truth. For Foucault, for example, truth is impli­
cated in pouvoir-savoir, the pcwer-knowledge that 
aims to enslave in the moment of Knowing. Truth is 
already a repression of the heterogeneity of meaning, 
and of the inconsistent and contradictory productivity 
manifested in art and in madness. For post-struc­
turalism, scientific truth is merely an artificial 
closure of the signifier into a firm signified. 1 his 
attitude would equally extend towards logical argu­
ment as a progression of established validity.
(3) Post-structuralism entails the most far-reaching
rejection of authorship yet. Whereas structuralism
only denounced authorship implicitly by ignoring it
in its analysis of texts, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida
and Dele use have all in one way or another stated
27that, in Barthes's words, "the author is deaa" .
Also in their texts do they evade the consistency 
and unity that authorship implies. As Robert Young 
puts it,
"Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida are the names of 
problems, not 'authors' of doctrines. Their 
work is interrelated, but in no way homogeneous."
10.
(4 ) The lack of homogeneity in post-structuralist 
texts is an effect of their profoundly auto-critical 
nature. In criticising metaphysical categories ox 
thought, Derrida also constantly displaces his own 
categories, lest they become metaphysical themselves.
For Barthes, the auto-critique consists in the notion 
of paradox that never "hardens" into accepted opinion 
or doxa, but remains productive of ever-new meanings.
(5) If metaphysics and science are anathema to post­
structuralism, so is the idea of metalanguage. As
Barthes has it,
"...the text liquidates all metalanguage, whereby 
it is text: no voice (Science, Cause, Institution) 
is behind what it is saying."
Metalanguage is implied in the notion of progress in 
science or in knowledge; Foucault's notion of sell.— 
enclosed eoistemes that divide and fox low one another
" * 1 ' *2Q
arbitrarily constitutes a negation o^ metalanguage • 
Lacan, too, has noted that "no metalanguage can be 
spoken. '
(6) From structuralism, post-structuralism has inherited 
an overwhelming concern with language, but whereas 
structuralism, or at least structural linguistics, 
sought to describe language scientifically, post­
structuralism would stress the heterogeneous plurality 
of language that falls outside scientific description.
The concern with writing, or £criture - rather than
the spoken language that Saussure took as the con­
crete manifestation of language - serves to underline the 
post-structuralist conception of language as a multiple 
and infinitely open productivity.
We have said that IT, hr and LL are post-structuralist 
texts, or that they belong within a general post­
structuralist tendency wir ~ ^ajor characteristics 
we have outlined above.
Robert Young, whom we have already quoted, has defined 
the problem of reading a post-structuralist text in 
this way:
"As a self-reflexive discourse, which constantly 
divides itself against itself and transgresses 
its own systems, post-structuralist criticism 
avoids becoming fixed, avoids becoming an esta­
blished method. It is this self-critical, self- 
transforming aspect that is often found so 
irritating and so confusing in post-structuralist 
thinkers. Looking (mistakenly) for a completed 
system, the reader finds it impossible to pin 
down and systematise a series of texts. Instead, 
all he gets is the uncertainty of, for instance, 
Lacan's 'r.crits' ('Writings' ). Once tnis aspect 
is recognised, however, the reade" can feel 
less bewildered, and reassured tL ; at least 
his being at sea is to the int. fhe break­
through occurs when he re:..", s s that his unease 
and uncertainty are not the product of a failure
to understand, but an anticipated critique of
32his own will to knowledge.
However, the realisation that is to Young a break­
through is precisely for us the extension of the 
problem, for what we shall be attempting will be to 
present three texts which indeed constitute a critique 
of our will to knowledge, as part of a thesis, which 
is essentially a will to knowledge in microcosm. In 
short, how does one treat open, autocritical writings 
within the closure that a thesis both by its etymology 
and by tradition seems to present and require?
The immediate option would be to ignore the ‘speci­
ficity of the texts within the post-structuralist 
tendency in favour of discussing them as a belated 
lapse in the evolution of Barthes as a structuralist 
theoretician. We would then be able to offer a series
of well-founded criticisms of their inconsistency, 
contradictoriness, sloppy thinking, rhetorical excess, 
as well as their lack of systematicity and argumen­
tative unity. Such an approach would not be without 
precedent, as Barthes has already been biographically
discussed by Thody:
•’Like Val€ry, he (Barthes) maintains that once 
a text is published an author has no intellec­
tual property rights over it. The critic and 
reader are free to make of it what they can, 
and to apply what methods they please to bring 
out what the official English translation of 
S/Z calls 'the plurality of its systems, its 
infinite (circular) *transcribability".• And 
if Barthes can write about Racine, as he did in 
the early 1960s, in terms of the recurring and 
unconscious structures in his work, there is no 
reason why 1 should not write about Barthes as 
if he were a man and not what he calls a mere 
•emitter of codes'.
Low the quesvion arises whether, by ignoring the 
specificity of a post-structuralist text in the 
interests of systematising it for one's own causal 
discourse, by treating Barthes as ^ust another author, 
in other words, one would not be perpetrating an act 
of fabrication in itself without any cause whatso­
ever.
It is therefore a question of finding a methodology, 
a way of reading that does justice to the text by 
not reducing it or treating it naively sociologically 
as an example of the fasnion for enigma amongst 
Parisian intellectuals, and at the same time 
showing the necessary order, consistency and lucid 
expression defined by the notion of a thesis. It 
could therefore only be a matter of compromise - 
given the post-structuralist project that aims 
exactly at undermining characteristics of the latter 
order.
It is of course possible to see the language oi a 
thesis as a metalanguage wherein various conflicting 
and inconsistent theories may he measured against 
each other or ambiguity and equivocality done away 
with for the sake of lucidity and unequivocality.
If such a characterisation is to be feasible, it would 
have to be substantiated, especially in view of the 
vast amount of contemporary work that has oeen 
severely critical of the tenabiiity of a metalanguage* 
This would include the work of Quine Kuhn'^ and 
Feyerabend in the Anglo-American context , as well 
as various contemporary varieties of Marxism, such 
as that of Althusser57, not to mention all the post- 
structuralist figures referred to earlier on. The 
concern with the epistemological break that has 
entered most debates on methodology has had its 
concomitant in the rejection 01 metalanguage or any 
theory of radical translation38 whereby terms from 
one theoretical language could be translated into 
either another theoretical language or a metalanguage*
In the absence cf a metalanguage, it remains j-or us 
to briefly state the conditions of our compromise.
In the first instance, we shall be deviating from 
any hypothetico-deductive format that may be expected. 
Instead, we snail approach the texts on their terms, 
ie. acknowledge that they are plural, heterogeneous, 
contradictory, etc. Furthermore, we shall not impose 
a model on them and try to discern an argument or 
set of definitive statements in them that is not 
there.
Cur way of ordering our reading of these texts will 
be to select certain key concepts in them, which will 
be used as headings under which to discuss aspects 
of these texts. These aspects will from time to 
time be situated in the general context of
post-structuralism and indetermined discourse in an 
attempt to render them more intelligible than they 
would be if viewed in isolation.
We shall accept the post-structuralist rejection 
of authorship as principle that separates texts, 
unites ethers and scatters itself within a text 
in the form of authorial intentions^.
Finally, we shall offer a reading of a literary 
text which will not constitute the application of 
a critical model gleaneo from the texts - which is, 
needless to say, impossible as neither they nor 
post-structuralism as such provide for models - 
to another text. Rather, such a reaaing will comprise 
the bringing into contact of these three quasi-theo- 
retical texts with a fictional one by employing some, 
if not all, of the significant concepts to be found 
in them.
2. Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes and The Pleasure 
of the Text
a. In certain respects RB and FT are very similar, both 
being composed of short aphorisms and sharing a number 
of primary concepts, but in others they are very 
dissimilar. Whereas IT remains close to pleasure/ 
jouissance', which is not really its sul ]ect matter 
in the usual sense, but a site which is posed, elabo­
rated, crossed, cicled, ect., RB is more spread out, 
relating the most diverse of sites and ideas, such^as, 
for example, the aphorism entitled, "The rib chcp" , 
which electrifies what could otherwise have been an 
inconsequential personal anecdote with significance 
for a textual theory. (Apart from the obvious Christian 
mythological association with the rib, a phallic element 
around which the pre-eminence of the male - God 
manufactured £ve from Adam's rib - is articulated, 
the rib as part of the body which is cast out quite 
carelessly, is also a metaphor for the text, the 
latter having been part of the writer's body too.) 
Whereas FT maintains a given degree of ellipsis, Rn
vacillates between a relatively direct theoretical
language on the one hand, and playful, ambiguous utter­
ances on the other, thereby not limiting itself to 
any sites whatsoever.
Such a characterisation is, naturally, provisional as it 
is only valid at first glance and from within the 
kind of closure that would register IT or as "one,
whole text". Rather, each aphorism is a text on its own,
so that both FT and RB are series of short texts. This 
is borne out by the organisation of both books, which 
contain no analytic or synthetic structure - by which 
meanings are layered to form a persuasive argument
in the manner of a conventional theoretical text 
but merely an alphabetic, and therefore arbitrary, 
sequence of short, fragmentary writings.
b. Concepts in Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes and 
The Pleasure of the Text
i. The Incertoxt
Kristeva, who introduced the term "intertextuality" 
into its current usage, also proposes he notion 
of transposition as complementary and perhaps prefer­
able to intertextuality, because it does not lend it­
self to the "banal sense of ’criticism cf sources 
"Le terme H’inter-textualite designs cette 
transposition d’un (ou de plusieurs) syteme(s) 
de signes en un autre; mais puisque ce terme 
a et' souvent entendu dans le sens banal de 
'critique des sources’ d'un texte, nous lui 
preferons celui de transposition, cui a I’avantage 
de pr^clser que le passage a’un syst&me signiflant 
& toi autre exige une nouvelle articulation du 
thetique - de la positicnnalite enonciative et
denotative."41 
Intertextuality has thus nothing to do with another 
text, or "influences" of texts on each other, as a 
literal understanding of the term may suggest, 
however, intertextuality also has a direct bearing on 
the subject, such as a reader or author. For whereas 
intertextuality is the transposition of sign systems 
into each other, the effects of the transpositions 
on the subject constitute what Kristeva calls a
signifying practice;
"...I shall call signifying practice the est­
ablishment and the countervailing of a sign 
system. Establishing a sign system calls for 
the identity of a speaking subject W A h m  a 
social framework... Countervailing a sign system
17.
is done by having the subject undergo an un­
settling, questionable process...”
We can see that Kristeva's conception of intertextualitf 
is partly semiological and partly psychoanalytic.
The semiological aspect of intertextuality lies, of 
course, in the notion of sign systems, whereas the 
psychoanalytic dimension consists in the effects 
of intertextual transposition on a speaking subject; 
the two are conjoined wherever signification takes 
place. Despite the subsequent loosening of "inter- 
textuality" by especially English-language commentators, 
nowhere in Kristeva do we find a deviation from the 
rigour with which she first postulated it; the quo­
tation in French above from La revolution du langa^e 
poetique43, being an attempt to restore some rigour 
to intertextuality by reterming it "transposition", 
bears this out. In contrast with Kristeva, Barthes 
dispenses with the strictly psycho-semiological 
or, to use Kristeva* s own neologism, scmanalytleal - 
conception of intertextuality and, in fact, also 
loosens it drastically, but in an altogether different 
fashion from those who reduced it to a literal 
’ inter*-play of themes and influences between texts.
Firstly, we encounter in I2.44 and 'the tero
"intertext'*, which differs qualitatively from 
"intertextuality". Kristevan intertextuality 
circumscribes a specific mechanism, amongst others, 
within sign systems, namely that they transpose them­
selves into each other so that any sign system, as 
soon as it operates as such, is in fact an amalgam 
of various sign systems interacting. A sign system 
such as a text, for example, may consist of any 
number of transpositions from cinematic, journalis­
tic, familial, ideological and such-like systems of 
signification.
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We may differentiate the Barthesian intertext from 
inter textual ity by characterising it as Kietzschuix?., 
rather than semiological or even semanalyvical.
Rather than rigorous, the inte* ' xt is a roost 
notion which easily translates —nto the ostensible 
imprecision of "a circular memory" ; instead of 
pointing out a mechanism whose effects we may D e ­
serve but which is itself immanent to such effects, 
the intertext names the flow of intertextuaiity 
itself.
If we are not to dissolve the intertext into a kind 
of textual mysticism, it is important that v/e exa­
mine it quite carefully. In RB, the following formu­
lation is to be found:
'•The intertext is not necessarily a field 01
influences; rather it is a music of figures,
metaphors, thought-words; it is the signi-
i'ier as siren . . . " h 1 
’his sentence is best read.backwards: the word 'siien 
uas three distinct meanings, all three of which are 
brought into plvy were. Firstly it refers to the 
Greek mythological creatures who were half woman,
half bird or sometimes fish, and who caused sailors
to wreck their ships upon following their enchanting 
singing; secondly, the shrill and piercing noise 
produced by ambulances, police cars, etc.; and in the 
third instance, a siren is also an acoustical in­
strument giving off a sound for the purpose of mea­
suring the number of vibrations within a tone. The 
s.ignifier as siren, which is the signifier of the 
intertext, therefore carries with it an enchantment 
as beautiful as it is lethal, a possible message of 
brood, mutilation or death, and stands in a leading 
relation to a ship or another tone which will trace 
its dangerous course.
The siren-signifier serves to extend the idea of a 
•'music of figures (the figure being the body seen 
and apprehended at any given instant, the body 
passing through a kind of stroboscopically lit-up 
series of "sightings" none of which stands in a con­
tinuous or transcendental relationship to any pre­
ceding or following one), metaphors, thought-v/ords"
(is a "thought-word* not the word in its amorphous, 
rising, pre-expressed state?). Elsewhere, the intertext 
is defined as "the impossibility of living outside 
the infinite t e x t % The intertext, unlike intertext- 
uality, is therefore entirely unsystematic; it is 
purely a negative possibility, the apprehension of 
that force, in the Nietzsch°an sense, which is 
diverted, blocked, passed through various permuta­
tions to form relationships between which fields of 
activity are constituted which we term texts. That 
force may properly be called pleasure, which, like 
Nietzsche's will, is forever in a state of becoming.
extrapolating then, we may say the following about the 
intertext: that .it stands in a definite relation to 
pleasure, .'itLout pleasure, no intertext is possible, 
for hearing the music of the intertext, seeing the 
siren-signifier glimmering in the distance, involves 
being sustained by the flow of pleasure. Taking 
pleasure in a text is akin to the dangerous form 
of understanding that Nietzsche proposed; it entails 
placing oneself at a risk which, in the case of 
pleasure, is the imminent seizure of jouissance 
which may bring ecstasy but, as we shall see below, 
also a cissolvc similar to death.
ii. Pleasure/Jpuissance
The concepts of pleasure and jouissance, as well 
as the distinction between them, are never rigidly
defined; they are always prone to a shifting, and 
despite their frequent invocation in PT and R£, the 
discourse forming between and around them remains 
M incomplete"^ •
To the literary theorist, probaoly, a certain amount 
of jocularity surrounds the notion of “pleasure”.
To those who seek to gain knowledge irom texts, ie. 
to bring the practice of reading under the sceptre 
of science, pleasure is an untheoretical no cion 
which does not deserve to be mentions: scholarly
debate. Within the various intuitionist and formalist 
traditions of literary thought, on the other hand, 
aesthetic contemplation may bring a kind of pleasure, 
but this form of enjoyment is always linked to the 
morally good, the beautiful and aesthetically valuable, 
in short, the latter pleasure is always of the mind, 
as opposed to that other element within ,he oldest of 
the occidental dualisms, the body.
It is therefore possible,-even if one rejects the 
aforementioned approaches, to underestimate pleasure 
as a radical concept; to deem it a highly interesting, 
thought-provoking but nonetheless minor deviation from 
other available apparati critici.
Again, we may point to Nietzsche, not as an origina­
tor of the meaning of pleasure, but as an initiator 
of the discursive practice'1'* which provided for the 
possibility of thinking it. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
"sensual pleasure" is held as one of the three most- 
cursed things in the world !, the other two being 
"lust for power" and "selfishness". Zarathustra 
renders six maxims in gloriiication oi sensual plea­
sure; the first may suffice to indicate for us the 
potentially revolutionary position, from both a 
literary and philosophical point 01 view, that pleasure
assumes:
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11 Sensual pleasure: goad and stake to all hair-
shirted despisers of the body and anathematized
as 1 the world* by all afterworldsmen: for it
mocks and makes fools of all teachers of con-
52fusion and error."
As this passage bears out, the crux of Nietzsche*s 
conception of pleasure is that it is antipathetic to 
the entire Western metaphysical tradition, for pleasure 
and its domain, the body, is a '-negative* to both 
the old Judaeo-Christian schema of soul-flesh (only 
the soul being enduring) and the more recent ration­
alist episteme which has strengthened this dicho­
tomy by positing the mind as the supreme locus of 
human awareness and furthermore reducing the body to 
a simple physicality mostly defined by medical science.
Deleuze has commented that the alternate view 02 
the body as an object for theory and for science 
does not only derive from Nietzsche, but was alread; 
being posed in Spinoza .
In the second instance, because pleasure is essen­
tially a thing of the present, it pits itself against 
most of our histories and epistemologies which accord 
a primary importance to the past and to tne knowledge 
that has accumulated in it. Thirdly, needlesss to 
mention, pleasure lends itself to hedonism, the bogey 
of Western ethics ever since Aristotle defined happi­
ness in terms of moderation.
However, in Nietzsche's evocation of pleasure we 
should not merely read the word negatively, ie. in the 
sense that the "afterworldsmen" - priests and Chris­
tians, but also all other spiritualists and idealists - 
dismiss, forbid or administer it, but also regard 
it positively as a force the study of which may hold 
an anti-metaphysical possibility.
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We may now return to Barthes. Like Nietzsche, he too 
sketches the ’’negative'1 of pleasure whilst at the same 
time admiring it and suggesting its affirmation : 
"Imagine someone (a kind of Monsieur Teste 
in reverse) who abolishes within himseli all 
barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by 
syncretism but by simple discard of that old 
spectre: logical contradiction; who mixes every 
language, even thore said to be incompatible; who 
silently accepts every charge of illogicality, 
of incongruity; who remains passive in the face 
of Socratic irony (leading the interlocutor 
to the supreme disgrace: self-contradiction) 
and legal terrorism (how much penal evidence 
is based on a psychology of consistency*.).
Such a man would be the mockery of our society; 
court, school, asylum, polite conversation 
would cast him out: who endures contradiction 
without shame? Now this anti-hero exists: he 
is the reader of the text at the moment he takes 
his pleasure. Thus the Biblical myth is reversed, 
the confusion of tongues is no longer a punishment, 
the subject gains access to jouissance by the 
cohabitation of languages working side by side:
i
I
the text of pleasure is a sanctioned Babel.
This passage, which is being quoted in full on the 
grounds of its significance, enumerates the effects 
of pleasure on the reading subject, ie. that it 
engages him in a process of radical dispersion and 
de-structuring. The latter is certainly obvious; 
not so obvious, and more important in tnis quotation, 
are the points of reference which define the, substance 
and the limits of this dispersion. These are, inter 
alia: the abolition of classes and exclusions, logical 
contradiction, Socratic irony, penal evidence, court, 
school, asylum, V: e myth of Babel. These reference
23
points are extremely succinct signs pointing towards 
those vast domains, institutions a.id activities that 
produced, and still produce, that Western subject 
against whom Nietzsche fulminated with his "afterworlds- 
men11, and whom we are attempting to leave behind in 
our reading of texts. All of these, be it the class 
system first illumined by harx, the exclusion of per­
version, madness and criminality, Plato’s dialogues 
in whi the adversary is forced to surrender by
means ^  the snares in which his own utterances 
catch him, as well as the disciplinary mechanisms 
of the court, school, asylum , etc., depend on 
logical non-contradiction for supplying the necessary 
links that unite them into the edifices of cultural 
power which produce the subject. The discarding of the 
principle of non-contradiction is therefore the only 
way to disrupt the fixity of the subject within 
determinate power relations, and to give him "access 
to jouissance,,b 1. Thus the reversal of the myth of 
Babel signifies not only a reversal of the relation 
between linguistic diversity and punishment but, in 
a wider sense, indicates that fundamental rupture 
of the subject with his Judaeo-Chr-stian tradition.
The pleasure-jouissauce distinction bears a super­
ficial resemblance to some of the binary oppositions 
to be found in earlier texts by Barthes. This resem­
blance has led commentators to construct a certain 
systematic Barthesian theory:
•'The experience offered by the reauing of writer- 
ly texts has been described by Barthes in his 
book he plaialr du texte... Plaisir seems to 
come from the more straight-forward processes 
of reading, .iouissance from a sense of break­
down or interruption... Translated into literary 
terms this suggests that where pleasure inheres 
in the overt linguistic ordering imposed by the 
'readerly' text on its material, bliss comes
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comes about in ’writerly* texts, or at climactic
moments in ’readerly* ones, when that order
58breaks down..."
And further:
"Our creative responses to these latter texts
(ie. texts of .iouissance - parentheses mine)
or moments is what turns us into ecstatic
59
ecrivains as we read."
Here then we have a tidy ordering of the binary 
oppositions in S/Zfe0, together with pleasure and 
jouissance, which could schematically be represented
as:
Readerly (lisible) text Writerly (scriptible) text
ecrivant ecrivain
consumption production
pleasure jouissance
"order" "gaps" or "breakdown"
If pleasure is the radical force containing alternate 
cultural, epistemological and literary possibilities 
that we have sketched above, then certainly it cannot 
be merely a self-explanatory element in a series of 
binary oppositions relating to texts.
Whereas the notions of ^crivain-ecrivant, 
scriptible do stand in a certain constant relation 
of opposition to one another, the case of pleasure 
and jouissance is substantially different. However, 
even where the oppositions of S/Z are concerned, they 
also admit of the "margin of indecision" to wuich 
pleasure and jouissance are prone0 1, although to a 
lesser degree. Thus the relation between ecrivant 
and Ecrivain deviates from a binary one in.that the 
gcrivain is also the opposite of the consumptive 
reader; the consumptive reader, the ecrivant and the 
ecrivain stand in a kind of triangular relation, a 
triangle of which two points occupy a subjective, 
authorial space and the third point a non-subjective,
non-authorial space; the mutually supportive relation 
between the ecrivant and the consumptive reader 
causes a further imbalance in the triangle. And then, 
as far as the lisible-scriptible opposition is con­
cerned, in KB a third term which does not entirely 
supercede it but at least undermines its pretensions 
towards a universal typology, is proposed, namely the 
receivable , to which we would want to return in 
our discussion of textuaiity below.
It follows that any combination of these notions from 
S/Z into a theoretical set must be somewhat tenuous. 
When they are then linked to pleasure and jouissance, 
the entire serj.es of connections becomes highly 
putative, if not untenable, not least because of 
the fact that the relation between pleasure and 
jouissance is not binary, but rather continuously 
altering depending on the flow of desire in the text.
Jouissahce is not an extreme degree of pleasure, nor 
is pleasure a "minor jouissance"v"^. An "incommuni- 
cation"^ exists between the two; the subject who 
enjoys both the text of pleasure and the text of 
jouissance is therefore a "split subject"^ (ie. 
historically, as it is impossible to experience 
both pleasure and jouissance at the same time).
Before we proceed further, it is necessary to mention 
pleasure and jouissance as they occur in the texts 
of Lacan. The word "jouissance" is, of course, well- 
known as colloquial French for "coming" in the sexual 
sense (jouir). As such, it has been widely used, 
especially by the French Surrealists as well as 
Picasso in various works featuring puns such as 
"JOUrnal" ("jou" also being played off against ”jeu", 
meaning "game" and "jouer", meaning "to play")^ , 
However, Lacan, in conjunction with his associates,
such as Leclaire, seems to have been the first to 
adorn the term with a special theoretical significance. 
Leclaire sums up the function of the subject in re­
lation to jouissance in the following way:
•'The function of the subject is to support 
the most perfect of antinomies: this anti­
nomy may be described as being that between 
the assentation of truth and its transgression,
that between zero and one, between speech and 
6 Vjouissance."
The "split subject"68 of PT, divided between pleasure 
and .jouissance, and by the incommunication between 
the two, corresponds closely to the antinomic 
subject described by Leclaire; in FT too, pleasure 
falls on the side of speech whereas jouissance is by 
definition beyond it. As the quotations irom uacan 
and Leclaire on page 21 of PT bear out, the 
concept of jouissance as it occurs in the latter and 
in RB is very much Lacanian. As such we may summarise 
jouissance as follows:
1. That it takes place in a body, whether it be 
linguistic or human.
2. That it is always associated with a mark, a letter., 
a split or a cut.
3. That the symbol of jouissance is the phallus, object
of both male and female desire.
4. That jouissance entails the annihilation of the 
subject.
5. That jouissance is an absolute.
6 . That jouissance cannot be spoken; as soon as such
an attempt is made, the subject is re-constituted.
Lacan, unlike Barthes, holds a Freudian notion of
pleasure as the satisfaction of need and demand,
giving rise to the following relation between
pleasure and jouissance:
"...For it is pleasure that sets the limits
on .iouissancc, pleasure as that which binds 
incoherent life together, until another, un­
challengeable prohibition arises from the 
regulation that Freud discovered as the pri- ^  
mary process and appropriate law of pleasure.” 
This quotation appears, of course, out of context 
and, especially with Lacan, one should not draw too 
many conclusions from it. However, we merely need to 
note the ideas that, firstly, "pleasure binds inco­
herent life together" and, secondly, that pleasure 
limits .iouissance. Clearly, what we may define here 
as the psychoanalytic concept of pleasure, is quite 
incompatible with the eminently decodifying, prodac­
tivist pleasure of Nietzsche and Barthes. In psycho­
analysis, pleasure as the satisfaction of demand, is 
always a conjunct of demand, but in Nietzschean 
discourse70 it is self-productive as a force.
The question now arises: how can a basically psycho­
analytical concept of iouissance be married to a 
Nietzschean notion of pleasure, as is evidently the 
case in i:r two texts? In traditional theory, sub­
ject to the theory of non-contradiction and an over­
riding systematicity, an epistemological rift of this 
kind would have been demolishing. But for groundless 
thought, thought that does not found itself on a firm 
basis - which could be either an a priori or a more 
general order of consistency - the cracks between in­
compatible elements do not cause a collapse, but 
ratuer augments the productivity of such thought. The 
thought of FT and RB is probably not completely 
exempt from a foundation; it nevertheless, in its 
diversity, its borrowings, its playful intercourse 
with psycoanalysis, assumes the theoretical mode of 
71a bricolag^ .
Again, it must be emphasised that there is vast
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difference between this kind of theoretical bnccla&e 
that consists in making certain incomplete connections, 
and the completing connections perpetrated by oevre- 
makers, criticised above, which consists in a smooth- 
ing-over of differences for the sake of theoretical
coherence.
tt remains to address ourselves to the question 
of how pleasure is produced and in what manner jouissance 
occurs. Naturally, in the present instance, we are 
concerned with textual pleasure which, nonetheless, 
is not necessarily related to books, but may manifest 
itself anywhere in any kind of language in the wider 
sensej because jouissance takes place outside language 
and independant of any situation, no differentiation 
between textual, erotic, or any other sort of jouissance
is possible.
To reiterate, pleasure is connected to tne body:
••The pleasure of the text is that moment when 
my body pursues its own ideas - for my body 
does not have the same ideas I do."
The body rather than the "I" - the subject, person, 
ego - is therefore the field of pleasure. However, 
the text is a body too. The connection of the sub­
ject's body and the textual body thus makes opera­
tive the production of pleasure. Before such a 
connection, no such pleasure is produced or, rather, if 
the subject* s body is producing pleasure during a pre­
connective moment, it is doing so as another bo ay.. 
Mutatis mutandis, the body is always producing pleasure, 
as it is constantly being crossed by intertextual 
transpositions; because the body is always the locus 
of the text, a particular text is merely a certain 
articulation of the body's register of pleasure. The 
following may be a useful hint as to this actvity.
••The more a story is told in a proper, well- 
spoken, straight Toward way, in an even tone,
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the easier it is to reverse it, to read it inside 
out (lime, de Segur read b; Sade). This reversal, 
being a pure production, wonderfully develops the
pleasure of the t^xt. ,,75
Whereas Kme. de Segur read by Sade is an extreme exam­
ple of such a "reversal", it takes place, to a varying degree, 
in all texts. Thus, a pure production + is always in 
operation in the text, and in the production of pleasure.
Here we arrive at another incompatibility in our texts, 
namely that between the concept of pure production 
*hich, in an unstated way, informs the entire elaboration 
of pleasure and an "open" textuality - and that of the 
psychoanalytical subject. Pure production belongs to 
the domain of .mechanism - and connections between mecha­
nisms, organs and bodies - where any reference to the 
"subject" is always ironic, as a suspect term for a 
rather pernicious illusion 01 humanism.
As a pure production, there is not "pleasure" on the 
one hand, and "spoken pleasure", its expression, on the 
oth>r hand. Both belong to the same "moment", the sane 
production within language (togrther with, as we shall 
see, the "reported pleasure" of criticism).
Jouissance, however, is outside the latter production, 
not only as a breakdown and a seizure, but also because 
its correlates, the subject and psychoanalytical 
pleasure, are "missing".Implicit in Lacanian jouissance 
as a kind of lapse in subjective continuity, it seems, 
is a return to subjecthood after the seizure has passed.
In this respect the kind of jouissance refered to rn ij 
and R3 is of special interest in that it never en­
tails a return to subjecthood. The subject does not 
recuperate from his jouissance, but the mechanics of 
p l e a s u r e - product ion take over instead after jouissance.. 
Whenever jouisnance ooes not interrupt the flow of
pleaswv, tb» former is felt as boredom75! boi-*# 
j; |u. L for. t!.- continuous absence of jouissance.
lii. h- Text as Body,
In Ecrits, Lacan already suggested tnat language 
and, by extrapolation, the text - is a body:
"language is not immaterial. It is a subtle 
body, but body it is. Words are trapped 
in all the corporeal images that captivate 
the subject; they may make the nystenc 
pregnant, be identified with the object 
of oenis-neid (penis-envy), represent tne 
flood of urethral ambition."
To conceive of the text as a body is thus, in the 
first place, to regard language as a materiality. 
Secondly, as we have already indicated in our 
re; • ;hs concerning Nietzsche, the "body" circum- 
• ,  'he Dionysian - as opposed to the Apolionic
aspect of Western culture.
the conception of the text as a body also
does away with the subject-object problematic:
"On the stage of the text, no footlights:
there is not, behind the text, someone
active (tne writer) and ^ut front someone
passive (the reader); there is not a subject
77and an object." 
rne textual body is not an object, nor is it the 
fusion between subject and object; it is merely one 
body amongst others. A further distinction arises 
between the body of the so-called "pheno-text" - 
the body as seen and discussed by science, in 
Barthes1s ordering - and the body of "erotic rela 
tions" which produces jouissance ; the first is 
a stable text not prone to sudden changes or dis- 
ruptions, whereas the body of jouissance - to which
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the text of pleasure/jouissance is related - "4.3
no more than the open list of the fires of lang- 
79uage
The use of the fire image vis a vis the body of 
jouissance is significant in that it immediately 
invokes, for us at least, the German word "Brandling", 
a well-known term in hietzsche's The Gay Science, 
which is discussed by Jacques Derrida in Eperons ^ .
A paradigm of brand is set up by the words, "Hier 
stehe ich inmitten des Brandes der Brandung." This 
paradigm of Brand, related to the "burning surf", 
could well be extended by us to encompass/ignite 
desire, whose restless movement and amorphous 
incompleteness is also a burning.
The fascination of the flame is obvious; in pre- 
Socratic philosophy it provided for the paradox 
of empty being, or a form witnout substance. Botu 
Nietzsche in The Gay Science and Barthes in PT revive 
toe old paradox; toe flame is an ever-c .anging materia-, 
effect, but nonetheless no comfortably apprehended existent.
We have thus two distinct bodies: toe physiological 
or pheno-textuai body seen by science, and the body 
of jouissance, the flaming sea of erotic relations, which 
cannot be grasped because of its fleeting production. The 
textual body is always related to the body of jou­
issance , and never to the body as seen by science.
Let us consider this carefully. The physiological 
body is, of course, not "naturally" our body, even 
though accepted opinion may. have it so. -he .physio­
logical body is merely an epistemological construct 
mapped onto us under the terms "body" or "anatomy", 
and thus seen by science, in tne same way as quasi- 
scientific criticism and commentary secs an expli­
cable, interpretable pheno-text where there is a
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productivity of pleasure.
The erotic body as an extra-8cienti1ic Brandung 
stands in the same relation of ut er distinction 
to the scientific body as the textual body stands 
to the pheno-text of criticism. Furthermore, both 
the pheno-text and the physiological body 
duced by the same ensemble of structures within 
the rational-scientific episteme; they are in very 
many respects mvjh the same. However, according 
to PT, the text has " human form" and is a "figure", 
an Managram’1 of our erotic body ^. The idea, here, 
of an anagrammatical relation between the erotic 
body and the textual body is interesting. As in, 
say, Breton's famous anagram, AVIDA DOLLARS con­
sists of the same letter elements as SALVADOR 
PALI, but in another combination, and with an al­
together different effect. And, as in many, but 
not all, anagrams, the anagram parodies o g nal
combination, ie., in this instance, the vulgar Am­
erican commercial success of the painter In question. 
Perhaps one could say about an anagrammatical re­
lation that it always scrambles the original com­
bination to effects of difference. And is this not 
what one could expect of the erotic body as it com­
poses its elements and relations into a textual 
body? This activity of scrambling could possibly 
be compared to Freudian displacement, were it not 
for the fact that the latter takes place by means 
of associative paths between ideas, which are to 
some extent predictable, whereas scrambling is tied 
to the arbitrariness and unpredictability of letter, 
or anagrammatical, combinations.
iv. Textuality
The text is a body, but apart from that, it must 
be clear by now that the use of the word "text" 
in RB and PT is relatively unusual, if not unique.
It is necessary to point this out, especially in
SSS’
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productivity of pleasure.
The erotic body as an extra-scientific Brandung 
stands in the same relation of utter distinction 
to the scientific body as the textual body stands 
to the pheno-text of criticism. Furthermore, both 
the pheno-text and the physiological body are pro­
duced by the same ensemble of structures within 
the rational-scientific episteme; they are in very 
many respects much the same. However, according 
to PT, the text has ”human form" and is a "figure", 
an "anagram" of our erotic body ^♦ The idea, here, 
of an anagrammatical relation between the erotic 
body and the textual body is interesting. As in, 
say, Breton's famous anagram, AV1DA DOLLARS con­
sists of the same letter elements as SALVADOR 
DALI, but in another combination, and with an al­
together different effect. And, as in many, but 
not all, anagrams, the anagram parodies the original 
combination, ie., in this instance, the vulgar Am­
erican commercial success of the painter in question. 
Perhaps one could say about an anagrammatical re­
lation that it always scrambles the original com­
bination to effects of difference. And is this not 
what one could expect of the erotic body as it com­
poses its elements and relations into a textual 
body? This activity of scrambling could possibly 
be compared to Freudian displacement, were it not 
for the fact that the latter takes place by means 
of associative paths between ideas, which are to 
some extent predictable, whereas scrambling is tied 
to the arbitrariness and unpredictability of letter, 
or anagrammatical, combinations.
iv. Textuality
The text is a body, but apart from that, it must 
be clear by now that the use of the word "text" 
in RB and PT is relatively unusual, if not unique.
It is necessary to point this out, especially in
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view of the widespread popularity of the word, which 
has almost become a more fashionable synonym for 
’’novel" or "story" without any sacrifice of the struc­
tural and narrative coherence associated with the 
latter two terms.
Many aspects of textuality have already been dealt 
with above, as everything that we have been discussing 
ultimately pertains to it. However, we have to delimit 
a few ideas that revolve perhaps closer than others 
around the sometimes less than easily comprehended 
notion of "the text" as it occurs in PT end RB.
In the first place, "the text" in the latter two 
texts, is not only a descriptive term, but also 
prescriptive in the sense that if one is able to 
discern the kind of Text talked about here, then one 
is already free of certain inhibitions, dogmas and 
codifications. To put it in Barthes's terms, the rea­
der who is capable of "taking pleasure in a text" has 
already been socially'and ideologically ”subverted . 
Theoretically, such a "reader”, if it is at all 
meaningful to still refer to him as such, need not 
turn the pages of a book in order to take pleasure 
in the production of textuality. Rather, he is con­
stantly enveloped in The Text everywhere, the global 
production of language that does not stop when one 
closes one’s eyes, but rather continues in a similar 
way to the "movies on the back of one^s eye-lids” 
induced uy a drug such as 1SI)V .^ Thus, in RB, it is 
pioclc-jied i
"I have a disease: I see language. What I should 
simply hear, a strange pulsion - perverse in 
that in it desire mistakes its object, reveals 
it to me as a ’vision’, analogous (all allow­
ances made) to the one Scipio had in his dream 
of the musical shperes of the world. The pri­
mal scene , in which I listen without seeing, 
is followed by a perverse scene, in which I
imagine seeing what I am hearing. Hearing de­
viates to scopia: I feel myself to be the
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visionary and voyeur of language."
Although the Text is omnipresent, it is of course 
extremely diverse and we may distinguish small islets 
rising out of its mass, attaining a certain focus of 
their own; islets which we call ‘'texts*.
j.n PT, we find a distinction between "texts of plea­
sure" and "texts of jouissance". The former derives 
from, and remains within, culture, whereas the xatter 
unsettles the reading subject to the point of 
"bringing to a crisis his relation with language."84 
Rather than being, like lisible and scrlptlble, a 
typology of texts, by which certain texts would be 
classified as "texts of pleasure" and others as 
"texts of jouissance", it defines the perennial 
split^of textuality itself. Thus, any text, except 
perhaps for the most boring - in the sense of an 
absence of jouissance - and prosaic realistic pro­
ducts such as commercial bestsellers, wich contain 
no possibility of pleasure or jouissance because 
their production is so rigidly repetitive, is al­
ways split between the ongoing intra-cultural produc­
tion of pleasure and the violent eruptions of 
jouissance. The text of pleasure and the text of 
jouissance are not two "levels’1 within an adumbrating 
textuality, but two thoroughly distinct activities, 
one being more or less intraneous to textuality in 
the broad sense, and the other completely extraneous.
The traditional debate in literary theory has always 
been spread along the axis of essence-history, with 
most formalists claiming an historically transcenden­
tal 'aesthetic essence and most historicists opting for 
an historically determinate topos mostly tied to 
the figure of the author. The text of Pf and RB 
is neither transcendental, nor topic:
"The text itself is atopic, if not in its
consumption at least in its production. It 
is not a jargon, a fiction, in it the system 
is overcome, undone (this overcoming, this 
defection, is signification). From this atopia 
the text catches and communicates to its reader 
a strange condition: at once excluded and at 
peace. There can be tranquil moments in the 
war of languages, and these momenta are 
texts...
Because texts do not lend themselves to a ready 
conceptualisation, ie. an identifiable combative 
position within the war of languages (which is also 
a war between ideologies), they are "tranquil mo­
ments” v where combat is suspended for the production 
of pleasure and the play of languages. Unlike the 
self-enclosed discourse of ideological language, 
the text, although certainly not free of ideology, 
is always open to the play of various ideologies; 
as it is put in FT, "ideology passes over the text 
and its reading like the blush over a face (in love,
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some take erotic pleasure in this colouring)." '
Rather than bringing about combat as it does else­
where, ideology in a text can actually cause a 
split where it encounters another ideology, and 
thus be a source of desire and even of jouissance.
We have said that the notion of textuality in these 
texts is both descriptive and prescriptive. In its 
prescriptive aspects, this textualny not only de­
fines an already existing kind of text, but also tends 
to anticipate a radically new text or which we at 
present have only an inkling. The latter text is 
entitled the "receivable” in the following passage 
from RB:
"In S/Z, an opposition was proposed: readerly/ 
writer!). A readerly text is one I cannot 
rewrite (can I write today like Balzac?); 
a wrlterly text is one I read with diffi­
culty, unless 1 completely transform my
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reading regime. I now conceive (certain texts 
that have been sent to me suggest as much) 
that there may be a third textual entity. 
alongside the readerly and the writerly, 
there would be something like the receivable.
The receivable would be the unreadesly text 
which catches hold, the red-hot text, a product 
continuously outside of any likelihood and 
whose function - visibly assumed by its scriptor 
_ would be to contest the mercantile constraint 
of what is written; this text, guided, armed 
by a notion of the unpublishable, would re­
quire the following response: I can neither 
read nor write what you produce, but 1 receive
it, like a fire, a drug, an enigmatic disor- 
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ganisation.'1^
All indications are tnat we cannot conceive of a 
receivable text in any detail, as our most far-reach­
ing and transgressive texts at present onl> 
its possibility, let us, however, consider the two 
characteristics of the receivable mentioned above, 
namely that, firstly, it would have the function 
of "contesting the mercantile constraint of what 
is written” and, secondly, that it would be "guided, 
armed by a notion of the unpublishable."
The mercantile constraint of literature has been
well put by Deleuze:
"...Another sort of book reflects the bour­
geois contractual relationship, which is at 
the basis of secular literature in its com­
mercial aspects:'1 buy from you, you give me 
something to read.' This contractual.relation­
ship involves everyone: author, publisher, 
reader. There is also the political book 
(revolutionary in inclination) presented as 
a rook of extant or future institutions. All 
sorts of mixtures among these types take place 
(contractual or institutional books may be
treated as sacred texts» lor example),, lor 
the various kinds of codification are so per­
vasive, so frequently overlapping, that one 
is found embedded in the other."
It is obvious that the bourgeois contractual basis 
of literature goes much further than a mere co-optation 
or aufhebung by a state or capitalist apparatus, as 
was at one time thought, especially during the irank- 
furt School vogue, specifically as a result of 
Marcuse's formulation in his essay on "repressive 
tolerance"91. It is neither affected by an under­
taking not to sell books or to distribute them on 
a non-profit basis, nor by a socially or commercially 
unacceptable content, which may include formalism 
for formalism's sake, esotericism, as well as the 
various heavily codified forms of pseudo-transgressive 
pornography or politicism. In addition, one may 
well imagine the continuence of this relationship 
within any of the present-day socialist economies.
(We need not mention the nost 01 other, more naive 
"solutions", such as paid or non-paid public reci­
tation, "happenings", anonymous texts, etc.).
The receivaole text, if it is to be more tnan an 
optimistic avant-gardist fantasy tor us, ougft to 
be the question: how can the contractual relation­
ship and its seemingly infinite capacity lor dis­
placement, be disrupted? In this regard, unpublish- 
ability may be a guide and a weapon, but it is cer­
tainly not an answer in a literal way, if we con­
template the possibility that a contractual re­
lationship may already be manifest in the subject's 
relation with language, long before thac language 
is literally written dow . Rather, unpublishability 
must be deemed an indication ol transgression, 
of a socially and literarily belligerent text that 
confronts all relevant codes in such a way that no 
present set of norms regarding legal, commercial
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or aesthetic acceptability, could possibly accomodate 
it, regardless of whetner such a text is actually 
printed or not.
The "receivable" would never be "written": as "enig­
matic disorganisation", the receivable text would 
never attain to the degree of fixity that would 
constitute a "written". As such, ostensibly, it is 
difficult to distinguish the receivable text from 
the "writerly" (scrintible) one, for the latter too 
remains ever-productive as a play of signifiers never 
closed by becoming signifieds. If the new problematic 
of the receivable is therefore to be distinguished 
from the scriptible, it would probably have to be 
with reference to its transgressiveness.
Who can visualise, today, a contemporary Marquis 
de Sade, declared insane and criminal, and incarce­
rated on account of his writings? Censorship may no 
longer be an issue in Western Europe, but in other 
parts of the world, such as South Africa, it is not 
tng to end soon. That fact, together with the 
widespread confinement and controls made possible 
by the various micro-political discourses of power 
illumined by Foucault, may well provide lor the 
kinds of discursive and textual confrontations that 
would banish certain texts to an "outside" from 
where they could only be received and never written.
v. Play
At various moments in PT and there are references 
to "play", "the game", etc.-? These literal mention- 
ings are not that frequent, and relatively devoid 
of an overwhelming degree of complexity, however, 
it would be highly impossible to appreciate tne 
conception of language and especially of writing 
(icriture) in these texts without sketching a certain 
background which docs not support them, but rather
extends behind them as a depth providing a very 
specific resonance. As an example, the following 
passage from RB may be quoted, not for its content
but for its resonances:
"...Then there are the countless antitheses 
(deliberate, farfetched, corseted) and word 
play from which a whole system is derived 
(pieasure:precarious / bliss: precocious).
In short, countless traces of the work 01 
style, in the oldest sense of the word. Yet 
this style serves to praise a new value, 
writing, which is excess, overflow of style 
toward other regions of language and subject, 
far from a classed literary code (exhausted 
code of a doomed class). This contradiction 
may perhaps be explained and justified as 
follows: his way of writing was formed at a 
moment when the writing o.t the essay sought 
a renewal by the combination ci political 
intentions, philosophical notions, and true 
rhetorical figures (Sartre is full of them). 
But above all, style is somehow che beginning 
of writing: however timidly, oy committing 
itself to great risks of recuperation, it 
sketches the reign of the signiiiei* '
Actual terms (like "writing", "trace", etc.) do not, 
of themselves, resonate; but when they are used in 
connection with a writing conceived as an "excess" 
and "overflowing", they do - one could almost say 
inevitably, if it were not for the fact that the 
locus of a text is always relative not only to a 
specific "reader", but even to when, where .and how 
it is written (in the sense of "read").- acquire 
an echo w.dch could only belong to the problcrntic^ 
in the sense of a space that has been opened up, 
founded by Jacques Derrida, in turn traceable to 
Nietzsche.
It is in this regard th&i the play of KT and of RB 
is not tied to the term itself, the paradigms of 
iijeu” or "Lpiel", but rather occurs as a series of. 
resonances. Of court , these resonances do not ex­
tend exclusively towards the texts of Derrida, but 
by Dressing tiiem we could do much to affirm the 
Nietzschean "openness" of these texts, also in Keeping 
v/j th_ their status as post-structuralist theorising.
We have already mentioned the "anti-metaphysical" 
possibility harboured by these texts, that they 
are "groundless", "de-centred", etc. All ol these 
characterisations are related to their status as 
"play" and as ftcriture.
We may begin with the distinction introduced by 
Derrida between the two kinds of thinking about 
play: on the one hand, a Rousseauistic conception 
of play which includes structuralism as represented 
by Levi-Strauss and, opposed to it, the Nletnschean 
thinking of it, a distinction summarised at tne 
end of "Structure, Sign and rlay in tne Discourse 
of the Human Sciences":
"Turned towards the lost or impossible pre­
sence of tne absent origin, tnis structure, st 
thematic of broken immediacy is therefore 
the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, 
Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play 
whose otner side would be the hietsscnean 
affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of 
the play of the world and of the innocence of 
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs 
without fault, without truth, and without 
origin which is offered to an active inter­
pretation. This affirmation then determines 
the noncentre otherwise than as loss of the 
centre. And it plays without security, lor 
there is a sure play: that which ia limited
to the substitution of p;lven and existing, 
present, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation 
also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, 
to the seminal adventure of the trace.
There are thus two interpretations of inter­
pretation, of structure, of sign, of play.
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of decipher­
ing a truth or an origin which escapes play 
and the order of the sign, and which lives the 
necessity of interpretation as an exile. The 
other, which is no longer turned toward the 
origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond 
man and humanism, the name of man being the 
name of that being who, throughout the history 
of metaphysics or of ontotheology - in other 
woiJs, throughout his entire history - has 
dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foun­
dation, the origin and the enu of play 
Out of context, this passage could possibly be seen 
as cryptic, but it is an excellent synopsis not 
only of the purport of the essay in question, but 
also of the main thrust of Derrida s deconstruction 
of metaphysics. As we go along, it will become clearer.
> preliminary definition of play would be a "substi­
tution of elements". In the classical episteme, 
this play was both anchored and limited by a centre 
within a totality; the centre was both inside and 
outside the totality in that it determined the play 
of elements and structures within the totality, but 
was itself beyond this play. The centre assumed 
various forms such as arche (beginning), tel os (end), 
God, man, etc., which succeeded each other in the 
evolution of Western thought. With the structuralism 
of Jj6vi-Strauss, as was the case with Nietzsche and 
Freud previously, a de-centering is introduced: the 
sign, the primary element of the structuralist to­
tality , rathe. than being a centre beyond clay, is
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itself subject to such play, however, the thought 
of l^vi-Strauss and of structural .Ism is negative, 
nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic" in the sense that 
its de-centredness is defined in relation to classical 
metaphysics, it is a negative of the very old con- 
ception of a play of presence and absence.
This rather vulgar paraphrase of "Structure, Sign 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" 
must suffice for the moment, if only because our 
con ;rn here is not a precise analysis of struc­
turalist play, but merely a definition of it vis 
I vis the Kietzschean affirmative play that we wish
to elaborate.
Elsewhere, on the same page , we read:
"Play is always play of absence and presence, 
but if it is to be thought radically, play 
must be conceived of before the alternative
3b
of presence and absence.1 
This radical conception of play - a concep ion that 
we would also want to ascribe, broadly, to PT and 
KB - is exemplified in the equally radical notions 
of fcritvre, diff£rance and the trace.
In short, the advent of ecriture signals a disrup­
tion of the strict logic of the sign. The sign has 
never provided for a distinction between writing 
and speech, but merely for a distinction between 
speech (parole) and an abstract system of language 
rules (langue). Thus a kind of chauvinism of speech 
has prevailed, as the signifier has always firstly 
been the phone as it is heard in spoken language.
The paradox of written language within this logic 
is that it entails a "signifier of a signifier" , 
ie. a written signifier that signifies the phone 
that signifies the signified. Rather than being 
only pertinent to written language, this paradox 
affects all signifieds, whether spoken or written
to the extent V.at no signified can ever be certain; 
the result is that the chauvinistic prevalence of 
speech over writing is replaced by a general, pri­
mordial gcrlture which consists of a play o? written 
marks or grammes, traces or graphemes.
The play of gcriture is a play of differences. However 
the difference of one element in relation to others 
is always constituted by the trace of other elements 
within it. Thus, taking a simple example, in the 
sentence, "John is going home", the difference 01 
"home" in relation to all other possible uses of the 
word is consti uted by traces of "John is going" in 
it. The presence or the absence of the trace is there­
fore the basic constituent of play.
However, if we are to believe the quotation above, 
a radical conception of play must be conceived of 
"before the alternative of presence or absence".
Here the problem, mentioned in various instances 
by Derrida, arises as to how one is to think such 
a play, seeing- that our entire language is inherent­
ly metaphysical in its allegiance to presence. Rather 
than attempting to solve this problem by a futile 
idealistic attempt at jumping out of language, it 
can be articulated in such a way that presence is 
not circumvented or circumiocuted but arrested amid 
its own production. One such articulation, which 
is crucial for any so-called radical conception 
of play, is the notion of diflerance.
»Difference is neither a word nor a concept.
In it, however, we shall see the juncture - 
rather than the summation - of what Has been 
most incisively inscribed in the thought ol 
what is conveniently called our "epoch": the 
difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure$ s 
principle of semiological difference, differing 
as the possibility of (neurone) facilitation,
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impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference 
as the irreducibility of the trace of the 
othe. in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological 
di< cnce in Heidegger."9?
What dis . _aishes the thought of "our epoch", ie. 
that of Metzsche, Freun, Levinas, Heidegger, is that 
it no longer recognises a "full sign": tne signifi­
cance of the sign is now always understood in relation 
to a chain of other signifying elements as a play 
of differences between such elements. However, and 
this is really what the quoted passage is all about, 
the differences themselves cannot be grasped by 
any ordinary means, for such differences are never 
perceived, nor do they inhere in any concept. Whence 
the explicitly extraordinary device introduced by 
Derrida in the form of a purely graphic, non-verbal, 
non-conceptual differance.
Difference, if it has to be defined, can be seen as 
a kind of primal difference, that which is at the 
basis not merely of differences, but of differences 
between differences, ie. the play of differences.
It follows that differance cannot be "brought +o 
lig> by some or other naans, as it cannot be made 
present. By definition, differance encompasses that 
which is not present and not perceptible. Neither is 
differance an absence, for absence is merely the 
negative of presence; differance is therefore alien 
to any category of being.
The relationship between differance and writing 
(£critureJ is the following: The problem of writing 
is pof d by a questioning of the arche (origin), 
thereby undermining all postulates and certainties 
to the extent that everything becomes embroiled in 
strategy and risk. The play of writing is the op­
eration of strategies and riks, entailing an infi­
nite, complex meshing of chance and necessity.
Bifferance is a strategy within this p ay of writing, 
it has no enduring significance or value, and may 
pass into its strategic opposite at a later stage 
of the play.
Etymologically, differance derives from the two 
distinct meanings of the Latin diflerre, one of 
which is the common sense of "to differ", ie. "not 
being identical", a meaning which Derrida likens to 
a spacing that occurs oetween elements when they 
are thus separated in a dynamic way on grounds o 
identity.I'r.e other sense of differre is lacking 
in our notions of "differing" or "differentiating", 
namely "deferring", a temporalizing, a postponement 
until later which could be seen as a detour of "desire" 
or "will". In addition to this further meaning be­
queathed to it by the Latin, the a in differance 
also indicates difference as polemos, ie. an imme­
diately and irreducibly multivalent diiierence. 
Furthermore, differance is neither active nor 
passive but a "middle voice" between the two in 
the same way as "resonance" is not merely the infi­
nitive, ie. the activity, of "resonate", which is 
•resonating", nor just a passive noun.
Differance is profoundly at odds with the entire 
logic of representation. Classical semiology must 
also be reckoned amongst the categories of repre­
sentational thought, for in it the sign s always 
the representation of the .resent in its absence. 
the sign defers the moment of encountering the 
itself. The sign is, within classical semiology, 
a substitution for the thing itself, and therelorc 
secondary and provisional. Differance ends itself 
to a questioning of the secondarity and provision- 
allty of the sign, for differance is neither a "sign" 
nor a substitute in any sense; it does not represent 
any presence within a system of presence. Consequent­
ly, differance militates against the authority of
46
both presence and its contrary of absence or lacK.
In its links with the thought of "our epoch", dif- 
ferance as "tempcralizing-temporalization" may bu 
compared to Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical 
domination of the present as "now", as well as •> 
Saussure's notion of the arbitrary and differential 
character of signs; these signs are arbitrary be­
cause they are constituted by a system of differences 
and not by their own "fullness". Thus, in Saussure, 
we no longer have concepts, but only the possibility 
of conceptuality. Within language there are onlty 
differences, but these differenc.es are themselves 
only effects. Difference defines the movement of 
the play that produces effects of difference. 
Difference is therefore the non-full, non-simple 
"origin" of differences. However these "effects" 
are not the results of causes, therefore it might 
be more proper to speak of "traces'* rather than 
effects.
We may summarise the propensities of differance 
towards a radical critique of presence - and of 
any play that is conceived on its basis - in Derrida8 s 
own words:
M...Difference is what makes the movement 
of signification possible only if each ele­
ment that is said to be 'present', appearing 
on t1'1'1 stage of presence, is related to some­
thing other th n  itself but retains the mark 
of a past element and already lets itself 
be hollowed out by the mark of its relation 
to a future element. This trace relates no less 
to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and it constitutes what is 
called the present by this very relation to 
what it is not, to what .it absolutely is not; 
that is, not even to a past or future considered 
as a modified present. In order for it to be,
an interval must separate it from what it is 
not; but the interval that constitutes it in 
the present must also, and by the same token, 
divide the present in itself, thus dividing, 
along with the present, everything that can be 
conceived on its basis, that is, every being - 
in particular, for our metaphysical language, 
the substance or subject. Constituting itself, 
dynamically dividing itself, this interval 
is what could be called spacing; time's 
becoming-spatial or space's becoming-temporal 
(temporalising). And it is this constitution 
of the present as a ’primordial' and irredu- 
cibly nonsimple, and, tnerefore, in the strict 
sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, re­
tentions, and protentions (to reproduce here, 
analogically and provisionally, a phenomeno­
logical and transcendental language that will 
presently be revealed as inadequate) that I
propose to call protowriting, prototrace, or
qq
differunce. "
As we have been concern t here not with differunce 
itself but with the latter as a concomitant for a 
theory of play, we neeu not elaborate any further.
vi. The Imaginary
The translation of Lacan's term, imaginaire, fre­
quently used by Barthes, seems to have given cause for 
problems. Both Richard Howard, who translated RB, 
and Ricuard killer, wno rendered RT into Lnglish, 
use the terms "image-reservoir", "image-repertoire" 
and "image-system'1 variously. Bart of the dilemma 
is of course that Barthes combines the term witn 
others in a sometimes relatively novel way, such as
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Miller and howaz'd are not without merit, their tei- 
minology can be confusing, not only because three 
different i.nglish terms are employed lor the single 
French o:.-?, but also because it may tend to completely 
divorce Barthes's concept from that of Lacan, whien 
would seriously impoverise our understanding of it. 
Lacan's translators, as well as the translator of trie 
authoritative psychoanalytic dictionary of Lapianche 
and Lontalis, , Language of Isychoanalysis , use 
the capitalised "imaginary" throughout which, although 
something of a neologism in rnglish, seems to lenu 
itself more readily to standardisation as an ^ngiisii 
equivalent of 1 mar:inaire, while at the same time 
avoiding the possible confusion and imprecision v.:av 
may result from using a combination of English ter,./ .
The definition of .,aplancfce and Pontaiis is as gooa 
a place as any to start our reading of Barthes's 
notion:
"in the sense given to tuis term by dacques 
Lacan (and generally ugv-d substvntivczyv : one 
of the three essential orders of trie pm.) coo- 
analytic field, namely the deai, the Symbolic 
and the Imaginary. The imaginary order is cha­
racterised by ti.e prevalence vne - *-Iu«iun 
to the image of tnc counterpart (ie semuiapie)
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For Lacan, the imaginary order is first constituted 
during ti.e mirror stage when, due to toe p::% sivai 
prematurity of tne infant, its ego is formed not 
on the basis of an image of itself, out on tne basis 
of the counterpart's Image. from then on the euijfCt 
is caught up in tne deceptive milieu consisting 
resemblances to itself, as well as erotic and aggress­
ive tendencies ensuing from such resemblances, ti.c.t 
is the Imaginary.
As is usually the case when a concept is importe/
Killer and howard are not without merit, their tci- 
minology can be confusing, not only because three 
different hnglish terms are employed for the single 
French one, but also because it may tend to completely 
divorce Barthes's concept from that of Lacan, wnicn 
would seriously impoverise our understanding of it. 
Lacan's translators, as well as the translator of tne 
authoritative psychoanalytic dictionary of Laplanche 
and Pontalls, The Language °f Psychoanalysis , use 
the capitalised "Imaginary" throughout which, although 
something of a neologism in Lnglish, seems to lend 
itself more readily to standardisation as an ahglish 
equivalent of ima.iinaire, while at the same time 
avoiding the possible confusion and imprecision tnat 
may result from using a combination of English terms.
The definition of ^aplanche and Pontalis is as goca 
a place as any to start our reading of Barthes's 
notion:
"In the sense given to tuis term by Jacques 
La an (and gene ml ly used substantive: y : one 
of the three essential orders of tne p s y c h o ­
analytic ficic., namely the Bear, the aymco^ic 
and the Imaginary. Th- imaginary order is cha­
racterised by the prevalence 01 tne relation 
to the image of tne. counterpart (io semmauic;
For Lacan, the imaginary order is first constituted 
during tne mirror stage when, due to tne physical 
prematurity of tne infant, its ego is formed not 
on the basis of an image of itself, but on the basis 
of the counterpart1s image, from then on the subject 
is caught up in tne deceptive milieu consisting Oi 
resemblances to itself, as well as erotic and aggress­
ive tendencies ensuing from such resemblances, that 
is tr.c Imag inary.
As is usually the case when a concept is imported
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from elsewhere into tne present texts, it undergoes 
a certain change, mostly accompanied by an ironic 
or playful "loosening" of its meaning. Mot only is 
the fictionality of Barthes's childhood sell stressed, 
but the concept of tne Imaginary is subjected to a 
pun involving the ordinary sense of "imaginary" ire 
"image", the latter referring to the photo-images
with which KB starts:
"To begin with, some images: they are the 
author's treat to himself, for finishing his 
book. His pleasure is a matter of fascination 
(and thereby quite selfish). 1 have kept only 
the images which enthrall me, without my knovrrng. 
why (such ignorance is the very nature of 
fascination, and what 1 shall say about eu.ch 
image will never be anything but... imaginaiy).
The effect of the pun is the following: firstly, i v 
disarms the Imaginary as to its scientific pretentions; g
secondl”, it restores tne etymological relations 
of "imaginary"; thirdly, it maxes the psychoanalyic- 
al , theoretical, conceptual, into tne textva-, 
fcr the photographs do not represent the (abstract, 
subjective) Imaginary of the early Bart nes-subjec, 
rather they are merely tne images of a bodily exterior 
and therefore a text ,o be looked at and to do red..
l-he a-scientific use of "Imaginary" is quite consis­
tent throughout IT and R?. In fact, science is noted
as one of tnc l:.ia, tnaries oi cunL,uage.
"To identify accurately language's image-reservoirs, 
to wit: the word as singular unit, magic monad; 
speech as instrument or expression of thought; 
writing as transliteration of speech, the very 
deficiency o" denial of language as a piimaiy, 
spontaneous, pragmatic force. All these artifacts 
are governed by the image-r-scrvoir of science 
(science as image-n,servoir): iiguisties ex- 
prer-ls tht truth about lan, ,u.a^ e, but uni * i-v
in this regard: ’that, no conscious illusion 
is perpetrated*: new, that is the very definition 
of ttie image-reservoir: the unconscious of the 
unconscious."1 
Again one is struck by the kind of subversive ec­
lecticism practised here: an Imaginary as well as 
an unconscious is ascribed to language itself, how­
ever, rather tnan being a usu"1 form oi eclecticism 
that proceeds from half-knowledge and disregard lor 
the specificity of concepts, this is an example of 
the constant textualisat ion found in RB and PT.
Levels of thought, as well as all the commonly trans­
mitted distinctions between theory/fiction, reality/ 
reflection, etc., are all relegated to the realm of 
the text. The text is therefore "language without 
its Imaginary"'05, a language sans the units, divi­
sions and proprieties imposed by science.
In the fragment dealing with the Imaginary in RB, 
the concept is described as "epistemologically, 
a coming category"1' ' ("e; i 4. . >- ». it, unc
categoric u'avenir" in the original ''). Clearly, 
toe Imaginary is for nartues a type of instrument 
w.Hh which to check the hold of science on language, 
ratser tnan a strictly psychuanalytic«.J notion; by 
characterising science* as t.-.e Imaginary of language, 
the epist emol ogical consequence is to preclude tue 
scientific possibility as such when it comes to 
texts. Just as the ego is a fiction constituted on 
the basis of Images of counterparts, so the scienti­
fic object of language is an illusory effect of a 
constellation of i .ages of other scientific objects. 
However, and tuis is probably where the importance 
of the Imaginary lies as an cp-istc mological concept 
for the future, tuat is not to say that science and 
linguistics must cease to exist now that it is without 
basis. It continues as an i .aginary order, a paradox-
(which is entirely removed from any notion of a meta­
language which at least by implication entails conscious 
intelligibility), whereas the text is that region 
beyond it^ .
vii. Doxa/Paradoxa
A continual theme in all oi Barthes’s texts is, ox 
course, the critique of Nature. Wherever the natural 
appears, one must look for the ideological undoi- 
neath that sustains such apparent naturalness. Phe 
latter defines more or less the concern of, say, 
the early I-vthologies1 °': ideology is like a mask 
that has to be lifted in order +o espy an approximate 
reality underneatn• in this respect, the cft-menviored 
example of the Paris-:,atch cover showing a black soldier 
saluting the French flag nay be mentioned . however, 
in PP and RP there can be no question of a real and 
its masks, for tne concept o 1 Doxa as peremulij 
chan"inr acceptable opinion precludes any certainty or 
reality under neat;, it; it is now not a question 
tearing away the natural mask, but o.i displacing the 
boxa by means of eve-r-r.ow intellectual and artistic 
productions which may be appropriated by vhe boxa 
at some later sta< e but eluoes it at present.
"Reactive formations: a foxa (a popular opinion) 
is posited, intolerable; to free myself of it,
I postulate a paradox; then this paradox turns 
bad, becomes a new concretion, itself becomes 
a new Doxa, and X must seex lurther ioa a new 
paradox."111
The relationship between Doxa and Faradoxa is teat 
between the bid and the new, but also, in the lieal 
instance, between the rule and the breaking of it« 
Interestingly, this relationship is not limited to
i
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order:
I I  rpThere Is only one waj left to escape the
alienation of present-day society: to re treat 
ahead of it: every old language is immediately
coiRj:ronij  i. and every language becomes old once
it is rcj.. «+ .’d. How, enovatic language (the 
language p oduced and s,read under the protec­
tion of power) is statutorily a language of 
repetition; all official institutions are re­
posting machines: school, sports, advertising, 
popular songs, news, all continually repeat the 
3 8 structure, the same meaning, often the 
same words: the stereotype is a political fact, 
the major figure of ideology. Confronting it, 
the lew is bliss (Freud: 1 In the adult, novelty 
#ys constitutes the condition for orgasm1 ), 
Whence the present configuration of forces: on 
the one hand, a mass 'canalization (linued to the 
2 - petition of language) - a Canalization outside 
I.-., •- cut not necessarily outside pleasure - and 
on tne ot; er, a (i .arLin^l, eccentric) impulse 
toward the he - a desperate impulse that can 
j&f'h the c o i n o f  destroying discourse: an 
.' -fliipt to reprounce in historical terms the 
1 -.as repressed benoi- i-h the stereotype.
h . oj • t os it ion (the knife of value) is not 
necessarily between consecrated, named con- 
:ui ie:- (n.aterialisia and idealism, revolution 
and reform, c t v . ); but it is always and through- 
out between the exception and the rul< . For
example, at certain moments it is possible to 
support the exception of the hysties. ,
Anything, ratner than the rule (generality, 
stcreoiy; e , deduct: the consistent language) 1 '
Thi Boxan/; the ruli. cntail stereotypes, whereas the
S"
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latter are defined as follows:
"The stereotype is the wore, repeater w:. ■ o'-x 
any magic* any erithuniasm, as though i ware 
natural, as though by some miracle this recur­
ring word wore adequate on each occasion jor 
different reasons, as though to imitate could 
no longer be sensed as an imitation: an uncon­
strained word that claims consistency and is 
unaware of its own insi, tence. hietzsche has 
observed that 1 truth' is only the soliciiicaLion 
of old metaphors, ho in this regard the stereo­
type is the present path of 1 truth1 , the palpable 
feature which shifts tne inverted ornament to 
the canonical, constraining form oi toe 
signified."'1'
These notions are clear enough, and may possibly be 
read as a slightly new formulation of tne old 
ir.novation-recvperat ion schematic traditionally 
thought to be at tne heart of literary ^rogress, 
put, as is If-. toe cast in tne present text..,
we would miss the purport of toe ]}oxa-.vuradoxn re­
lation if wo weiv to i .nore toeii etymological link, 
wnicb also involves a measure of word play. he 
prefix "para" denotes, of course, "nearness" and, 
therefore, tne paradox of tne -artdoxa is that the^ 
are always close to or near the Doxa. Together with 
the " assages nvoted above, one itay read vne ^art..e ,icin 
paradox as an always-tnreatense cniity. it is sig­
nificantly described as a "retreat ahead", rather 
than a simple advance, which distinguishes the para,ox 
from mere "innovation".
The militancy of the paradox resides therein that 
it becomes a basis for criticism:
"Tne hew is not a fashion, it is a value, the 
-,f all criticism: our evaluation of the
E
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as m  M e t  s sc he, on the opposition between
a£Lki£ and base, but on that between Old and
hew (the erotics ol the hew began in the
eighteenth century: a long transformational 
process. '• 14
What distinguishes this conception of the Mew from 
Other theories of literary renewal, is that here the 
i.ev Goes not proceed from "originality” - which 
is necessarily related to that class of ideals con­
cerning "artistic creativity" which derives from 
the Renaissance, and which is still inordinately 
ubiquitous - but from a quasi-erotic, novel exception 
for its own sake. To posit the New as a critical 
value is not in itself extraordinary, on the contrary 
but to make it # e  only critical value seems quite 
-rusual, even, in this case, a radical reconstruction 
oi literary critical evaluation.
vi-- • jl-I’ -i-ciri', as P. rvcrsion
II it ever $o slightly dubious that the notion
of the New could be rescued from its idealistic 
trap,.mgs in past and pi.sent critical practice, 
t.Ge icea of criticism as perversion will probably 
suffice to differentiate the critical activity as 
envisaged in if and m  from most other forms.
In this notion, we encounter, then, a fundamental 
rupture with criticism as we know it, namely as 
a serious, evaluative, explicative, second-order 
activity which complements a first-order "creative" 
function. The dadaist may shout obscenities, but 
not the critic: his duty is to offer a post facto 
rationalisation, an integration of the paradoxical, 
tranngressive and unacceptable into the accepted 
literary history. The perverse critic, however, as 
a concomitant to his productive readership, abolishes
this first-order - second-order distinction from the 
start. Nonetheless, the reader of criticism is a 
11 second-degree reader", but in an altogether different 
sense to that of the traditional critic.
"How can we take pleasure in a reported pleasure 
(boredom of all narratives of dreams, of parties)? 
Only one way: since 1 am here a second-degree 
reader, I must shift my position: instead of 
agreeing to be the confidant of this critical 
pleasure - a sure way to miss it - I can make 
myself its voyeur: 1 observe clandestinely the 
pleasure of others, I enter perversion; the 
commentary then becomes in my eyes a text, a 
fiction, a fissured envelope. The writer's 
perversity (his pleasure in writing is without 
function), the doubled, the trebled, the infinite
—  < 4 C
perversity of the cricic and of his reader." 
Intertextually, any reader of necessity participates 
in the "infinite perversity" of criticism. All texts 
take part in t;.: pleasure of tcxtunliiy itself; 
therefore they are all in some respect voyeuristic 
and ; • rv-'rse. "Jrrvsrsity" sere must not be taken 
morally or as a value judgement, but in the sense that 
Freud employed the tern, namely to distinguish the 
undifferentiated (sexuality) from the normal (in 
.Barthes's terms, the doxie).
"Freud expresses the fact that sex is ron-human, 
and that desire is fundamentally undifferentiated 
and ignorant of the distinction between homo­
sexuality and heterosexuality, by his use of 
the term 'polymorphously perverse'. It goes 
without saying tnat ne #imply borrowed the 
word 'perverse' from the conventional linguistic 
distinction between the 'normal person' and the 
'pervert':
'If I have described childreu as "poly­
morphously perverse", I was only using
a terminology that wac generally current; 
no moral judgement v/as implied by the 
phrase. Psychoanalysis has no concern 
whatever with such judgements of value.1”110
Just as sexual perversity harks back to a pre-Gedipal 
"polyrncrphously perverse11 state of undifferentiated 
sexuality, so critical perversity will show propensities 
towards the undifferentiat -d Inter-text, where pleasure 
is equally produced in a non-Cedipal, amorphous way.
Perverse criticism, then, would be a type of recording 
of pleasure as it is produced. Although it is ob­
livious to the work-text differentiation, it would 
not be just an anti-intellectual mouthing at random 
of what is being read, if we think of the question 
posed on page 25 of "and yet: what if knowledge 
itself were delicious?" Perverse criticism, in its 
textual analyses, would proceed not from a rational­
istic injunction to knowledge, "better understanding", 
"appreciation of the work", etc., but from enjoyment 
for its own sake; in other words, in perusing knowledge, 
citing from scholarly works, the perverse critic 
is merely giving free reign to his perversely con­
strued kowiedgeable delectations*
In our reading of a text that is to follow this dis­
cussion, in order to demonstrate its uses in critical 
practice, we are going to relate the given text to 
other critical works and ideas, which would consti­
tute a perverting of the text in the present sense.
As we know from our remarks on intertextual.ity, a text 
is never a delimited and defined object, but an open 
field. Whence the notion of voyeurism (viz. the 
first quotation, above), as regards criticism: 
critical texts parti cl pate imr.vd lately in the pro­
duction of textualifey and reading them is therefore
lo approach the textual field and its pleasure from 
another, variant position, like a voyeur gains pleasure 
"by observing the pleasure of others. The notion of 
critical perversion thus defines the jnirror-within- 
a-mirror-like unfolding of texts that criticism 
helps to bring to bear on the text, an "infinite 
perversity", to use Barthes's term. This is even mere 
trenchant in the light of the bodily status of texts: 
vi;.e reatiinL oj texts and t eir critical counterparts 
constitute the bringing together of bodies.
ix. r :-. ression
The text is, as we have defined it, subversive, 
asocial, ...ilitant. But how does this subversion 
occur, anti what form docs it take?
22, we are informed that art seems historically 
and socially compromised; whence the attempt by the 
artist to destroy it11', however, because of the
ca .ci .y 01 t..c exc:.ant,c systr; . to "recu­
perate" all destructions and all rebellions, an 
alternate, paradoxical form of attack is the only 
via^e one. * ne lat er is not chosen, rather one is 
doomed to it:
"The ak ward aegis of this alternative is the 
consequence of the fact that destruction of 
discourse is not a dialectic torn but a semantic 
tern: it cocilcly taxes its place within the 
great s.e$aiological 'versus* myth (unite versus 
black); whence the destruction of art is doomed 
to only parau'-xical formulae (those which pro- 
ceec i.itcrajly against the doxy): both rides 
of the paradigm are glued together .in an ultima­
tely complioitous fashion: there is a struc­
tural agreement between the contorting and the 
contested forms.
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(iy subtle subversion I mean, on the contrary, 
what is not directly concerned with destruction, 
evcuies the paradigm, and seeks some other term: 
a third term, which is not, however, a synthe­
sizing term but an eccentric, extraordinary term. 
An example? Perhaps Pataille, who eludes the 
idealist term by an unexpected materialism in 
which we find vice, devotion, play, impossible 
eroticism, etc.; thus Pataille does not counter 
modesty with sexual freedom but... with 
laughter.)"" ''
Ihe reference to Bataille concerns, of course, his 
"literary" texts, rather than his theoretical ones 
and is not in itself cause for relating the above 
notion 01 paradoxical subversion to Bataille's con­
cept of transgression, however, as is the case with 
Perndean "play", "transgression" seems to echo 
throughout our texts.
nluucu^r; -cne very complete meditation on transgression 
by Bataille exists in Death and .Sensuality11^  the 
essay by fuucault on the subject'^ is perhaps, for 
our purposes, more useful as an explanation of the 
concept itself, rather than an enumeration of toe 
various xoci of transgressim found in Bataille's 
text, such as transgression in war, the orgy, marriage, 
etc. According to Foucault,
transgression is an action which involves the 
limit, that narrow zone of a line where it 
displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps 
also its entire trajectory, even its origin; 
it is likely that transgression has its entire 
space in the line it crosses. The play of limits 
and transgression seems to be regulated by &
->ir..plv ol .Aimcy : transgression incessantly 
crosses and recrosses a line which closes up
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behind it in a wave of extremely short duration, 
and thus it is made to return once more right to 
the horison of the uncrossable. But this relation­
ship is considerably more complex: these elements 
are situated in an uncertain context, in certain­
ties which are immediately upset so that thought 
is ineffectual as soon as it attempts to seize 
them."121
And further:
“Transgression, then, is not related to the limit 
as black to white, the prohibited to the lawful, 
the outside to the inside, or as the open area 
of a building to its enclosed spaces. Rather, 
their relationship takes the form of a spiral 
which no simple infraction can exhaust. Perhaps 
it is like a flash of lightning in the night 
which, from the beginning of time, gives a dense 
and black intensity to the night it denies, 
which lights up the night from the insidv, from 
ton to bottom, and yet owes to the dark the stark 
clarity of its manifestation, its harrowing and 
poise - singularity; the flarh loses itself in 
tnis space it m.^rus with its sovereignty and 
becomes silent now that it has given a name
to obscurity 122
Clearly, transgression has very little to do with 
the literal meaning of the word, as a crossing or 
violation of a i,oral, legal or whatever barrier.
If the concept approximates the ordinary sense of 
the word at all, it does so as its absolute. Trans­
gression in the usual sense seems to involve a given 
and pre-existing limit that is crossed. Thus, an 
absolute thinking of transgression necessarily dis­
turbs the transitive tendency so important to the 
meaning of the word itself, for what is a transgression 
that does not work upon a law of some sort?
8
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As Foucault points out, hataillean transgression 
does, of course, "involve the limit", but in an entirely 
different way: it takes place in an "uncertain con­
text". It is conceivable that transgression may take 
place within a certain context, such as, for example, 
the law that one plus one makes two; all errors and 
deviations from the lav/ do not affect its certainty - 
naturally, it is possible to imagine a situation 
where the mistakes exceed the adherences to the law, 
when the certainty of the latter would be jeopardised, 
but let us, for argument’s sake, accept the possibility 
of simple transgressions within certain contexts.
Every moral, religious and social context is probably 
mcertain; Eataille gives an example from Christianity: 
"V/e feel like laughing when we consider the 
solemn commandment 1 Thou shalt not kill * followed 
by a blessing to armies and the I'e Deura of the 
apotheosis, ho beating about the bush: murder
123
is connived at immediately after being banned I" 
Within an uncertain context, there is no movement 
from wit sin a system of rules to its outside, gather, 
the rule or lav; is announc'd in the same instant 
as its transgression is advocated. Transgression 
is therefore not confined to the "crossing" of the 
law: in appearing to cross it, the transgressive act 
also illumines and calls attention to the law itself, 
as Foucault’s very apposite metaphor of the lightning 
bolt in the night illustrates.
We could circumscribe transgression as the following: 
whereas laws ana rules in general appear certain, 
every transgression, if only for a brief moment, 
restores the ubiquitous uncertainty of the world.
During the moment of transgression, not- only the 
specific limit concerned, but all limits, are called 
into question.
Foucault’s essay emphasises, throughout, the significance
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of the night for transgression124, The night is both 
the absence that ensues from the death of God in .Vestern 
culture, as well as the unknown region not yet opened 
by a transgression. (The primordiality of toe light­
darkness theme within occidental culture is obvious.)
The night also defines the space of transgression, 
for the transgressive space is always unknown or, 
more precisely, non-exis tent prior and posterior bo 
the transgression that founds it in one illuminating 
eruption.
Another aspect, at least in Bataille, that is not 
to be divorced from transgression is its profound 
relation with sexuality and death. It seems that 
transgression is at least partly rooted, if such an 
idealistic term is permissible, in the paradoxical 
naturalism of the Karquis de 3ade - and not on account 
of Bataille having written on Sade. Like Sade's 
hedonistic life’s principle that, if adhered to, 
would destroy all life and consequently also all 
enjoyment of it, transgression, if affirmed to the 
fullest *xtent, would end in the nullification of 
all laws and rules, and thus also in the cancellation 
of the transgressive possibility. Jnlike the relation 
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, 
which provides for a predictable ratio between sex, 
work and death, with a kind cf Aristotelian mean 
envisaged between the two principles which would 
limit both excessive sexuality and death, transgression 
defines a plane beyond rationalism where death, such 
as the death of a tribal king, may unleash both more 
death and unbridlea sexual licence.
"Basically death contravenes the taboo against 
the violence wnich is supposedly its cause.
Host frequently the subsequent sense of rupture 
brings in its wake a minor disturbance which 
funeral rites and festivities with tneir ordeieo 
ritual, setting bounds to disorderly urges,
are able tc absorb. But if death prevails over 
a sovereign whose exalted position might seem 
to be a guarantee against it, that sense of
rupture gets the upper hand and disorder knows
1 peg
no bounds."
Transgression, as tataille and after him, Foucault, 
deals with it, defines a "beyond" or "outside" where 
cultural systems break down. Not only do texts par­
ticipate in cultural systems, but texts are equally 
systems unto themselves capable of transgressive 
breakdowns, for example when jouissance takes place. 
But perhaps more precisely, transgression always 
relates to a moral breakdown; textual transgression 
would therefore entail not so much jouissance, which 
is amoral, but disruptions of the text in its moral 
apects, which may or may not trigger off jouissance,
x. Si lit
We have already commented' cn the split between plea­
sure and jouissance, as well as introduced the idea 
of a split subject in tne course of our discussion 
on other topics.
In Freud, splitting or Spaltung is used primarily 
in regard to so-called "splitting of the Ego".
"Term used by Freud to denote a very specific 
phenomenon which he deems to be at work above 
all in fetishism and in the psychoses: the 
co-existence at the he T t  of the ego of two 
psychical attitudes towards external reality 
in so far as tins stands in the way of an in­
stinctual demand. The first of these attitudes 
takes a reality into consideration, while the 
second disavows it and replaces it by a product
of desire. The two attitudes persist side by
127side without influencing each other."
l.’n.! ike Freud, Lacan does not limit splitting primarily 
to fetishism and the psychoses, but considers it 
fundamental to the formation of the subject. The 
subject is, firstly, split between his "real" self 
and his representation within a chain of signifiers, 
the latter being the only self that he is conscious 
of. By definition, the subject is mediated by the 
symbolic order introduced between himself and the 
"real", and his image of himself derives from tnis 
mediation which includes a mediation through other 
subjects. Thus, the subject is founded by a splitting 
from his infantile .elf.
In RB, we encounter another of those strange literal- 
izings of psychoanalytical concepts which at first 
seem reductive, but is soon realised to be an extension 
01 the concept towards a more deconstructive use:
"For classical metaphysics, there was no dis­
advantage in 1 dividing1 the person (Racine:
Jtai rtpv.x hommes moi); quite the contrary, 
djeketi out in two opposing terms, the person 
advanced like a good paradigm (high/low, flesh/ 
spirit, heaven/'arth) ;  t h e  parties to the con­
flict were reconciled in the establishment of 
meaning: the meaning of Fan. This is why, when 
v/e speak today of a divided subject, it is never 
to acknowledge his simple contradictions, his 
double postulations, etc.; it is a diffraction 
which is intended, a dispersion cf energy in 
which there remains neither a central core nor 
a structure of meaning: i am not contradictory,
1 9H
1 am dispersed."
The question is: why relate the splitting of the 
subject at all to the rather banal phrase, J* ai 
deux hommos cn moi, and to the notion of contradiction, 
even if only to differentiate the split from these? 
moreover, in IT, the subject who enjoys both the
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-jlassure o.nd the text of jouissance, is 
1 • iw he spli on that account, to he a "living
unction"1^  . it seems that the notion of split 
- i't and HI have dual application: firstly, in 
i psycnoanalybic sense, especially as formulated 
by jacan and, secondly, as applied to literary dis­
course and to texts. It follows that a split subject 
•eading split texts lends itself to a multiplication 
spli s that is fittingly described as dispersion. ■
However, by differentiating dispersion from contra­
diction, the more limited split of psychoanalysis, 
ie. the one fundamental split between self and others, 
is implicitly extended: as Barthes says, "there re­
mains neither a central core nor a structure of 
meaning." for a contradiction, which is also the 
hallmark of dialectical thought, always implies 
some stability of meaning, a recogmsau-it. nxixy 
in terms of which to establish that which is in 
contradiction to it. 1he split of Lacanfan psycho­
analysis, being a split from an infantile self,
could possibly be seen as a form of contradiction, A
a contradiction in relation to a former, "lost"
pelf.
.0^ .1 vnu itvitip^ .icily oi splits entails, therefore,
)s no longer even a relative stability of meanings, 
a mediation through others and a representation of 
•i sel • . e split subject as diffraction does not 
participate in any stability, and has not even a 
putativeby "real" self. gather, this split subject 
is akin to the intertext, an immcdiate transposition 
oi subjectivities; in other words, what the notion 
of the intertext is to the text, too multiplicitous 
split is to the subject: both define the dynamic state 
of their respective textual and subjective functions.
n in- reading subject, the intertext and the split
subject more or less fuse in an an.bifent dispersion. 
Regarding tne split between pleasure and jouissance, 
as well as between tne text of pleasure and the texu 
of jouissance, this is not a single or fundamental 
split either, because it ta^es place along a variety 
of "seams" and registers, and does not obey any set 
of recognisable or predictable principles.
le it then still meaningful to talk of a human "subject" 
at all, or should wv rather begin to see this dispersed 
and variously split entity as a non-humanist mechanism? 
In tne following section, we attempt to do just that.
xi. Textual : a Ireliminary Conclusion
We have stressed that yT and RB are necessarily
contradictory; to do away with their contradicLoriness 
would be immensely truncating. But tne question now 
arises whether, by preserving these contradictions, 
by even pointing them out as such, we are not lapsing 
back into maintaining an idealistic textual speci­
ficity a^d, secondly, an extremely watered-down,
Iiberalised - in tne sense of apportioning equal 
trutn value to various competing statements - form 
of autnorsriip.
ivuch of the architecture of ?T and KB have been dealt 
with: the presence of ; wide range of psychoanalytic,
speciiicaliy j.acanian, concepts in them, the current
.
of kietzschean affirmation flowing through them.
However, we would want to claim that the relation­
ship of tnese texts towards psychoanalysis, for one, 
displays a rift. Jouissance, as we have seen, is the 
momentary dissolution of tne subject, cut with the 
implication tnat the subject nas been, and will return; 
jouissance entails therefore merely a series of 
dissolving punctuations of an otherwise continuous 
presence of subject nood. t.,asure, on the otner hand,
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is a pure production which inakes for a 11 split subject * 
but nonetheless somehov/ accomodates the retention 
of the subject as such. i.oreover the texts parade 
these and other contradictions quite openly. -te 
cumulative effect is that the rift between these texts 
and psychoanalysis becomes so wide and 1undamcnta1 
that we have to abandon Freud, lacan and any notion 
of the subject in favour of something like a "plea­
sure machine". The terminology itself is not that 
important, as long as we read the "subject" of i_i_ 
and nh not as a subject at all, but as an arrangement 
of mechanisms engaged in the production of pleasure 
and of desire. (As we snail see, tne latter would 
also circumscribe the "loving subject" of 11.)
In their Anti-Cedi ■ 1 \ Leieuse and Gu&ttari have
provided us with a theory of desiring-product ion 
that would, if read together with our texts, complete 
tne break with conventional, even psychoanalytic 
conceptions of textuality, in the direction of an 
anti-aumanist, nor.-s.Xeci ivc production of pleasure 
and (textual) desire. (In hn, ^nti-Cecipus is actually 
mentioneu‘ , but that is of uo uircc u concern uoic•j
In PT» a reference to desire occurs:
"An old, a very ola tradition: ntuonisn has 
been repressed by nearly every philosophy; 
we find it defended only by marginal figures, 
lade, Fourier; for 1,'ietzsche, hedonism is a 
pessimism. Pleasure is continually disappointed, 
reduced, deflated, in favour oi strong, noble 
values: Truth, Death, Progress, Struggle, Joy, 
etc. Its victorious rival is Desire: we are 
always being told about Desire, never about
Measure; Desire has an cpistea.ic dignity,
1 idpit asure does not... "
Tne desire spoken of here is of course tne oedi pal
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desire as thought within the framework of psycho­
analysis, which basrg itself on lack. The self-pro­
ductive, anocdipal desire ^f the Anu.-Oedipus 
corresponds very closely to pleasure as conceived in 
the above passage, as a gratuitous, marginal, declasse 
concept, ncre, for example, is how a noted french 
Marxist historian views Anti-iedipus;
"ly separating time from space, it turns the 
schizoid into an explanatory principle. It 
is the belated theorisation of a version of 
* leftism1 that has run aground on the politi­
cisation of this or that real but peripheral 
issue (prison, drugs, insanity, etc.) and has 
then sunk back into a negation of the 
political..."1^
Not only as theoretically d§ciasse problematics are 
the theory of pleasure and schizoanalysis related, 
but also intrinsically: both concern productions 
and, at least witnin our reading, transpose each 
other's conceptual ensembles intertextu&lly.
ahe starting point of I e Antu-. euipus is the schizo­
phrenic production of Judge oenreber, tne well-known 
"case" analysed by 1 revd through the details of the 
Judge's experience published under the title 
PenKwnrdi 'xeiten eines i.ervenxranxen in 190). wnereas 
freud treats the DenKwl-ra i net ten as a document of 
a delusion to be analysed across the distance that
normality and. scientific decorum interposes between
1 'iStne patient ana tne psychoanalyst ^, Beleuze and 
Guattari take Scnrcber1s utterances on the terms of 
the utterances themselves:
"Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A 
solar an.-n. And rest assured that it worxs: 
judge genreher feels something, produces some­
thing, and is catanle of explaining the process 
theoretically. Jometning is produced: the effects
68.
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of a machine, not mere metaphors."
The "desiring-machines" of the .tnti-Cedipus are 
neitner concrete nor abstract. Virtually anything 
can be a desiring-maehine: a part of a body, a house, 
the sky, possibly even a thought. The distinguj.sning 
feature of the desiring-maehine is its capacity to 
form connections witn otner machines. A definition 
of a machine would be: anything that interrupts a 
flow, the basic tenet of the Ant3-C edipus being that 
"everything flows". Thus an essential constituent 
of tne miantile stage, namely the frustration of 
the child's desire for nis mother's breast tnrougn 
competition with the father and his consequent, in­
sertion into tne uedipal triangle, is removea. instead 
of it being a matter of an infantile ana therefore 
pre-subject desiring the milk that he lacns, it is 
merely a macnine composed of the mouth that inter­
rupts the flow of mil a. . ,ven the senses and the sense- 
organs are machines that interrupt each otnox1s 
sensory flows: the ear with its flow of noise would 
interrupt the flew of sight emanating from the eye; 
each sense-organ "seer' or interprets the world 
only in terms of itself, the eye observing a silent, 
impalpable world, the ear discerning only a spectrum 
of sounds, m e  machines "plug" into each otner - 
|J such as, for example, the mouth-machine plugging
into its energy-machine, the breast - and form other 
machines, arrangements, multiplicities, etc.
I
I
By interrupting and diverting the flows, the machines 
produce. This production is, of course, a pure pro­
duction:
"For the real truth of the matter - the glaring, 
sober truth that resides in delirium - is that 
there is no such thing as relatively independent 
> spheres or circuits: production is immediately
consumption and a re- p process (enregistrement),
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wixnovc any sort 01 mediation, and the recording 
process and consumption directly determine 
production, though they do so witnin the pro­
duction process itself. Hence everything is 
production: production of productions, of actions 
and of passions; production of recording pro­
cesses, of distributions and of co-ordinates 
that serve as points of reference; productions 
of consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of 
anxieties, and of pain, everything is produc­
tion, since the recording processes are imme­
diately consumed, immediately consummated, and
137these consumptions directly reproduced." 
ho distinction is made between producing and the 
product, which is termed a
M...producing/product identity. It '3 this 
identity that constitutes a third 1 m in the 
linear series: an enormous u fferentiated 
object. Everything stops deu 4 r a moment, 
everything freezes in place - and then the 
whole process will begin ever again." -/
The connections between the machines are "binary- 
linear”, thus the "third term". The latter is a static, 
anti-productive "body without organs" that, as the 
quotation bears out, is always intrinsic to, ana 
simultaneously outside, the process of production. 
Within social production - tnere being, however, 
no distinction between social production (society) 
and desiring-production (the individual) - the body 
without organs is capital. Capital itself is, ob­
viously, incapable of production and yet, at the 
same time, both the precondition and resultant of 
the production process. Capital as a body without 
organs attracts the machines to it, so that production 
takes place on its surface and so that the recording 
processes are appropriated by it: the only way in 
which production may oe measured is in terms of
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"growth of capital", and so forth.
•This is a very sketchy paraphrase, but we can already 
sec how schizoanalysis could be relevant for textual 
production. Is there not a correlation between the 
body without organs of capital or the capitalist, 
and the author? We know that the "writer", and the 
"reader" for that matter, are merely points of reference 
where the play of the infinite Text may be observed. 
Textual production never ceases, and it is well 
possible to imagine other reference points for noting 
its passage, apart from the entities of "writer" and 
"reader".
A possible lacuna within the •textual theory as envi­
saged within previous chapters, would be its relative 
inability to account for the prevalence of reader- 
wri ter types of textual production, it is all very 
well to term such texts "closed1 or "repressed", 
but what, we may insist, sustains these closures and 
repressions? In this ret., c-ct, t no textual theory 
of rU) and iT is probably quite normative: it tells 
us .<ow texts to reiroduOc^, rather tnan
describing that vast textual industry of which the 
bestseller list is but one exemplification.
ic fuse rT anu a o with the Anti-oeaipi-s is, theo­
retically , a daunting tasix; with in the problematic 
of asystematic discourses it is likely to be impossible, 
ar w -j.1 as ur.desi. cible. However, the Anti-c edipus shows 
how a d.i-scourso on production can be used to analyse 
the repression and management of production to con­
stitute trie illusory entities of persons, families, 
state, etc. It seems almost a requirement for the 
theory of textual pleasure to enable us also, while 
at the same time affirming the pleasure, the eruptions 
of jouissance, the scrambling of codes and positions 
of reader, writer, and so forth, to analyse albeit
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in a playful, deconstructive way, the closure of texts. 
The textual industry that consists in the repression 
of productjre textuality, appropriating machines 
to it, is so vast as to predominate wherever a hand 
lifts a book so that an eye may plug into it.- In 
this respect, another observation by Deleuze, one 
that we quoted more fully previously, is relevant, 
namely that literature always involves the contract:
"I buy from you, you give me something to read''1 >d.
For the present, we are unable to offer any definitive 
views on textual desire, except that it would be that 
force within textual production relating to social 
production, the repressing codification of which 
fixes books in a closed circuit of exchange.
I
in a playful, deconstructive way, the closure of texts. 
The textual industry that consists in the repression 
of productive tcxtuality, appropriating machines 
to it, is so vast as to predominate wherever a hand 
lifts a book so that an eye may plug into it; In 
this respect, another observation by Deleuze, one 
that we quoted more fully previously, is relevant, 
namely that literature always involves the contract:
"I buy from you, you give me something to read”
For the present, we are unable to offer any definitive 
views on textual desire, except that it would be that 
force within textual production relating to social 
production, the repressing codification of which 
fixes books in a closed circuit of exchange.
3. A Lover's Discourse
a. Fragmentation Continued
If FT and RB seemed to deviate from the usual format 
in which literary theory is presented, then LD tends 
towards the unclassifiahle. It consists of eighty 
"fragments”, spread across 234 pages1 nd arranged 
alphabetically; nowhere do we find any noteworthy 
references to "literarture”, "reading", etc. Instead, 
the subject of LD is something that, in our time at 
least, has been mainly associated with advertising 
slogans and popular novels, namely "love". Our remarks 
on pleasure and anoedipal desire, as being declasse 
problematics, are even more relevant to love, for, 
as the inscription at the start of LD reads:
"The necessity for this book is to be found 
in the following consideration: that the lover's 
discourse is today of an extreme solitude. This 
discourse is spoken, perhaps, oy thousands of 
subjects (who knows?), but warranted by no one; 
it is completely forsaken by the surrounding 
languages: ignored, disparaged, or derided by 
them, severed not only from authority but also 
from the mechanisms of authority (sciences, 
techniques, arts)."1^1
Thus stated, the necessity of LD can also be seen 
in accordance with the already quoted statement in 
FT, namely that:
"...There is only one way left to escape the 
alienation of present-day society: to retreat 
ahead of it: every old language is immediately 
compromised, and every language becomes old 
once it is repeated."1^
The raison d'&tre of ID is thus also the perpetual 
movement of language and discourses, old languages 
becoming compromised, necessitating a further retieat 
ahead". At one time, ie. during the Middle Ages,
"love" of the courtly variety was the preponderant 
theme of epic poetry. Today, on the other hand, it 
has insinuated itself in an extremely banal form in 
the popular romance, sexistly advertised as "women's 
fiction". However, even in the latter genre, as the 
incitement to discourse about sex spreads , and 
sexology and popular psychology start to replace 
love as the primary thematic concern of the more 
effete examples of popular realism (hero and heroine 
no longer falling in love, rather their "personali­
ties" or "selves" go together so we.il), love now 
becomes an outcast concept, "forsaken by the sur­
rounding languages", as Barthes puts it. Thus, an 
"historical reversal" has taken place.
"(Historical reversal: it is no longer the 
sexual which is indecent, it is the sentimental - 
censured in the name of what is in fact another 
morality .)" '''^
LD is more or loss a catalogue of sentimentalities,
^  branch of possible feeling between lovers is deemed 
too tiny or inconsequential for inclusion in the text.
Although ID is ostensibly an alien object amidst 
known texts of literary theory, as we have indicated, 
it does show a certain resemblance to certain books 
habitually classified as fiction, such as for example^ 
the nouveaux romans of especially Nathalie Sarraute 
The latter texts also concern themselves with minute 
and precise delineations of human behaviour without 
fixing such behaviour to any specific personalities, 
characters or subjects. However, despite such 
resemblance it would be theoretical defeatism to 
discuss LD as a somewhat belated example of a nouveau
reman, simply because noveiistic and fictional cate­
gories seem so limiting and truncating in regard to 
the degree of textual and theoretical multivalence 
encountered in it. The conception of discourse in 
LD is the following:
"Dis-cursus - originally the action of running 
here and theze, comings and goings, measures 
taken, "plots and plans": the lover, in fact, 
cannot keep his mind from racing, taking new 
measures and plotting against himself. His 
discourse exists only in outbursts of language, 
which occur at the whim of trivial, of aleatory 
cicumstances.
These fragments of discourse can be called 
figures. The word is to be understood, not in 
its rethorical sense, but rather in its gymnas­
tic or choreographic acceptation...
Figures take shape insofar as we can recognise, 
in passing discourse, something that has been 
read, heard, felt. The figure i s outlined 
(like a sign) and memorable (like an image or 
a tale). A figure is established if at least 
someone can say:
’That is so true*. I recognise that scene of 
language. '
Each of the fragments of LD is such a figure14^, 
and a heading ("Absence", "Adorable", "Affirmation", 
etc.) as well as an introductory synopsis accompany 
it. A figure in its "gymnastic or choreographic 
acceptation" is, of course, a body frozen in time, 
a fleeting arrangement of limbs and features that 
is momentarily arrested by the intelligence in the 
way that one recognises, to remain close to Barthes' 
explanation, a certain movement in ballet. These
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figures are "both the "real", physical "bodies Of 
lovers in the most basic sense, and the signifying 
"bodies constituted by their exchanges of words, looks, 
touches, etc., as well as the immediate order of 
textual body that is being ac+ ' ised by the reader. 
Thus, the following comment appears between paren­
theses,
"(Ideally, the book would be a co-operative:
'To the United Readers and Lovers.1 )"
It follows that LD is by no moans an untheoretical, 
"novelistic" text: in many respects it is a continu­
ation old elaboration of PT and RB, using a slightly 
different vocabulary pertaining not to pleasure 
and certain textual or psychoanalytical concepts, 
but to "love" i  similar elements of movement, bodily 
sensation, hedonistic enjoyment and self-reflexive 
textual!sation are nonetheless to be found in all 
three texts. Before we proceed with the elaboration 
of "loving and reading", it is necessary to go into 
a series of intricacies arising from, as a starting 
p. int. at least,the cover of the French edition of LD.
b. The co v c of Fragments d1 un d lac ours ar.ourevx
The cover of the original LD can be seen on the 
following page. It shows a detail from a painting 
by the Renaissance painter, Andrea del Verrocuic1 r 
"Tobias and the Angel". The purport of this visual 
fragment has been thoroughly researched by Randolph 
Runyon in his article, "Fragments of an Amorous 
Discourse"1 . My own discussion will be dependent 
on the article for information about correspondences 
between LD, the apocryphal "Book of Tobit", Goethe's 
Die Leiden des .junge Werthers as well as Balzac1 a 
ja fausse waitress^, but will draw somewhat different 
conclusions from these correspondences.
how, the illustration, if one looks closely, seems
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Collection ^ I cl Quel 
AUX EDITIONS DU SEUIL
Illustration from the cover of Fragments d’un discours 
amoui'eux
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to contain the letter ,,1V‘ on the left hand aide, 
made up of the lines formed "by the left edge of the 
picture, the curve of the left arm and the edge of 
the downward flowing garment that the hand "belonging 
to this arm is grasping. Although not mentioned "by 
Runyon, the gaps on the right at top and bottom 
may provide for the outline of a "B", which would 
make Barthes’s full initials; nonetheless, in the 
absence of any authorial intention, naturally, this 
is quite an enjoyable piece of graphic speculation. 
However, Runyon wishes to attach signi. -c to this 
pictorial "R” apropos of the figure ”Uni .<•« in 1.1):
"...In the game of the furct to which Barthes 
likens the way his book might be read, one may 
hold on to the ring - to one of the eighty 
figures of the Fragments d1un discours amoureux - 
a second longer, if one desires, before passing 
it on: Union, the antepenultimate figure, will 
be our furct here.
Each of the figures is preceded by an ’argument’
that defines the area of the topic: ’UNION.
Drear, cf tot'1 union with the beloved.’ If
an amorous reading of the text leads us to see
’the reader’ where Barthes says 'the beloved',
if indeed one remembers that he describes the
book as a co-operative venture in which readers
and lovers are reunited, then this figure,
speaking of union, suggests reunion. The difference
between these two words, which can stand here
for the difference between reading the book as
a discourse on love and reading it as a discourse
on writing, is practically reducible to one
152letter, the same letter the cover frames." v
Apart from the fact that the connection between 
the "R" and "Union" seems rather arbitrary, the 
interpretation of the former as standing for the
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difference between reading the book as a discourse 
on love and reading it as a discourse on writing 
is dualistic: it supposes that loving and writing 
are two mutually exclusive, or at least sepaivi^ e» 
activities, something which the notion 01 a co-op­
erative of 'United Readers and Lovers'" explicitly 
denies. Runyon's remarks serve to highlight the 
hazards of approaching ID; for on the one hand one 
may dissolve it entirely into a generalised discourse 
on writing, ie. place it together with PT and RB, 
whereas on the other there might be a tendency to 
see LD as a kind of love manual or amorous catalogue 
without having any idea of its implications for a 
textual theory.
For an answer to the dilemma, we need merely recall 
the statement occurring in FT, namely that
"...the text liquidates all metalanguage by 
which it is text: no voice (Science, Cause, 
Institution) is beh1rd what it is saying."
If we are to accept 1 :ns definition wnicrv, in relation 
to our texts and the type of thoght occurring in 
them, seems eminently plausible, then there cannot 
be two orders of discourse, one on writing and one 
on love, with a third metalinguistic realm which 
would presumably reside with the reader. Rather, we 
would prefer to stress the pervasive productivity 
of pleasure that encompasses both writing and love. 
Which is not to say that the text and love are but 
two forms of an ambient flow oj pleasure; ro .her they 
designate two different domains of its occurrence.
We have said that as far as RB and VP go, the reading 
subject is the locus of the text and its flow; in LJ 
the loving subject is the locus of all ’’amorous 
relations", or the flow of love: it is not an 1 inter­
action" between subjects, but a one-sided projection
of desire onto the other. If we are going to distinguish 
between FT and RB on the one hand, and LD on the other, 
then it would be as general as the following: whereas 
PT and RB concern the Text, LB concerns Life. Albeit 
in a very tentative fashion, ID is an attempt' to ex­
tend the theoretical premises of textual pleasure 
from the text onto the plane of existence itself.
(Let these remarks suffice for the moment as we are 
going to pursue this thought below.)
Despite grasping the profound link between the textual 
and the amorous project, we should however not lapse 
into the reduction of reading "writing" where it 
says "loving", or vice versa.
To return to the present issue, the cover: Runyon’s 
alacrity at plunging straight into the "text behind 
the painting" 1 %  ie. the Book of Tobit, serves to 
disregard the simple elements of a play of visual 
signs ensuing from the isolation of the intertwined 
hands from the rest of the"painting. As they appear 
on the cover, the slightly contorted fingers of the 
upper hand seem to betray at least a suggestion of 
erotic energy; the gold container in the top left hand 
corner is held in front of the chest almost like 
a stemless goblet.
Of course, the complete painting by Verrocchio sig­
nifies exactly the opposite to the truncated detail: 
the figure on the left is actually the angel Raphael 
and therefore supposedly devoid of any erotic meaning; 
the expression on Tobias’ s face is serene and trusting; 
Tobias’s unusually bent fingers signify his mortal 
trepidations and human frailty, vis £ vis the calm 
fingers of Raphael; the meaning of the gold box is 
similarly revealed as being quite innocently utili­
tarian: it will contain the heart, liver and gall of 
a fish to be killed by Tobias1 "^'.
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Thus, the tension between the painting itsell and the 
use of a fragment (sic) from it on the cover of 
a book about love should forewarn us that the rela­
tionship between LB and the Bool. Oi To bit will be 
one of play and varying consistency, and not a series
of parallels.
c. Tobit, Werther, Balzac, Barthes
Although Runyon*s essay offers a very elaborate 
enumeration of corresponding elements in The Book 
of Tobit, the Sorrows of Young Werther, La fausse 
maltresse and Les serets de la princesse de Cadignan 
of Balzac, as well as LD (in addition, he brings in 
RB which we shall disregard), we shall only point 
to some primary ones, and concern us with the sig­
nificance of these rather than with their detail.
Briefly, the tale of The Book of Tobit goes as follows:
Tobit, a man of good works - his particular forte is
the burial of executed persons not allowed a funeral -
one night nas to sleep outside in the courtyard after
having buried another corpse. While asleep, some
sparrows let their droppings fall into his eyes,
thereby blinding him. Tobit
"...prayed to God for deliverance. At that very
moment, in a distant city, a woman named Sarah 
was praying for release from an affliction o^, 
her own. She had been given in marriage seven 
times, but each bridegroom was slain by an evil 
demon on the wedding night, and she was despairing 
of ever finding a lasting husband.
The same day Tobit remembered that he had leit 
a sum of money in trust with a friend in another 
city. Because of his blindness he could not make
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the journey, but he decided to send nis son,
(Tobias, to claim the money. The trip would be 
long and difficult, and the boy did not know 
the way. Tobit therefore chose to hire a trust­
worthy travelling companion for his son. The 
man who presented himself was none other than 
the angel Raphael, sent by God to answer Tobit's 
prayer, but neither father nor son knew bis 
true identity.
Tobit's fatherly benediction ironically invokes 
the angelic guide: 'Go with this man: God who 
dwells in heaven will prosper your way, and 
may his ar^el attend you’ (Tobit 5:6). Tobit 
is in that extraordinarily lucky position, 
although he does not yet know it, of being 
able to cause something to come about just by 
naming it. Barthes, similarly, can enjoy the 
dreamed of total union by pronouncing the right 
name for it. .  ^",u
Coming to the Tigris river, a fish leaped out, threat­
ening to swallow Tobias. However, the angel ordered 
Tobias to catch the fish and, after taking out the 
liver, heart and gall, they roasted and ate it.
As it happened, the heart and liver were later used 
by Tobias to frighten away the demons. That he will be able 
to wed Sarah (whom he has not met yet at this stage), 
is contained in the following passage, wherein Raphael
tells Tobias of her:
in Do not be afraid, for she was destined for 
you from eternity...1 When Tobias heard these 
things, he fell in love with her and yearned 
deeply for her.111 v
Interestingly, of course, Tobias falls in love with
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Sarah purely on the grounds of a description, some­
one else1s words about her, and before perceiving her 
in '•'he flesh. Before commenting on the significance 
of the latter fact, let us name a few items concerning 
Goethe*s Werther, singled out under its own grouping 
in the "Tabula gratulatoria" at the back of Fragments 
d* un disc ours amour cux ^ a n d  frequently mentioned 
in the text.
Werther, too, first learns of Charlotte through a
"fish", namely Heinrich: Werther meets him beside a
river (sic) while he is looking for flowers to give
to Charlotte: Heinrich refers to a time when he was
159"as hapiy, as merry, as light as a fish in water," 
which turns out to have been a period of madness.
Shortly after recounting his encounter with Heinrich, 
Werther concludes with the following passage in 
which he addresses his heavenly Father:
"Father, Whom 1 do not know*. Father, Who once 
filled my whole soul but now turn Your countenance 
away from me, call me to You... Could a man, 
a father be angry if his son returned unexpectedly, 
threw nis aims about his neck, and cried: * I 
am back, father*. Be not angry because 1 cut 
short my journey, which it was your will I 
should endure longer.'"1^
As Runyon points out, the latter sentence is rather 
more reminiscent of the Book of Tobit than the more 
well-known parable of the Prodigal Son, for the 
latter is not sent on a journey by his father, but 
leaves of his own accord without any set purpose.
Regarding Balzac*s hoc secrets rie la prlncesse ae 
Cadignan, referred to on page 214 of LB, the elements 
that ought to interest us are the following. The 
princess, Diane d* Uxelles, unlike her male counterpart,
Daniel d'Arthez, a writer, is immensely experienced 
as a (sexual) lover. However, she has never experien­
ced love as such: 1,11 1 fe been amused, lout I have 
not loved,11,161 -Through D'Arthez, she partakes of 
love for the very first time. The resemblance o 
Sarah, who has been married seven times without 
having had a single marriage consummated, is obvious. 
Whereas the intermediary figure in the Book of Tobit 
is the angel Raphael and the one in Werther is Hein­
rich, a close friend of D'Arthez going by the angelic 
name of Michel fulfills that r61e in the Secrets.
Like Heinrich, who has admired Charlotte, Michel has 
been in love with Diane previously.
In this context, the second relevant work by Balzac 
is La fausse mattresoe; we shall quote from the
oassage in LD:
"To impose upon my passion the mask of discretion 
(of impassivity): this is a strictly heroic 
value: 'It is unworthy of great souls to expose 
to those around them the distress they feel’ 
(Clotilde de Vaux); Captain kaz, one of Balzac’s 
heroes, invents a false mistress in order to 
be sure of keeping his best friend* s wife from 
knowing that he loves her passionately.
Yet to hide a passion totally (or even to hide, 
more simply, its excess) is inconceivable: not 
because the human subject is too weak, but 
because passion is in essence made to be seen... 
L^rvatus prodeo: I advance pointing to my mask:
I set a mask upon my passion, but with a discreet 
(and wily) finger I designate this rcasK. Every 
passion, ultimately, has its spectator: at the 
moment of his death, Captain Paz cannot keep 
from writing to the woman he has loved in 
silence: no amorous oblation without a final 
theatre: the sign is always victorious."
In this case, the false mistress is the third figure, 
conveyor of the love relation between the protago­
nists. What then is the significance of these re­
curring intermediaries, whose appearance we axe 
stressing at the expense of a host of other factors 
also unearthed by Runyon .in these texts (such as 
recurring figure eights^ ^  j?
Much of the answer is already evident in the passage 
we have just quoted in LD: they are literally trans­
mitters of love in the same way that, as was saia 
by Barthes on another occasion, an author is a trans­
mitter of utterances, and therefore a textual inter­
mediary. They are alter egos of either one of the pair 
of lovers who serve to make the love in question 
flow, and at the same time record and reveal that 
flow verbally. Hutatis mutandis they are the connec­
tive elements in a more or less triadic amorous 
exchange.
d. Loving and Reading
To love and to read arc not reducible to each other, 
as we have already indicated. However, the discourse 
on love complements the theory 01 pleasure in a vex^ 
important way, for textual pleasure and textual 
joui ssance occur within the textual body whereas 
love is a factor concerning, at least primarily, 
the physical body of the subject.
It is difficult to assess exactly what the purport 
cf LD in relation to PT and RB is, for on the one hand 
it is an extension of the latter two texts, and on 
the other a departure from them; Barthes’s unti ely 
death has made the entire project - even if we are 
to assume that all three texts are part of a unitary 
project - even more incomplete. but, in an extraordinaxy
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way, ID, in constituting a discourse in a sphere as 
general and as encompassing as the sensual, amorous 
body of the subject, almost provides for, in con­
junction with IT and RB, a new "philosophy". Of 
course, as we have reiterated so often, we are not 
dealing here with a systematic form of discourse., 
therefore we could not expect to find a philosophic 
system in the way that existentialism or Marxism 
forms a system. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable 
consistency - not in the logical sense, but in the 
more elusive sense that the thickness of a liquid 
is of a certain consistency - to these texts which 
separate them from most other texts, including others 
by Barthes. And especially with the addition of ID, 
what started as a relatively specific theory within 
a specific domain, ie. textual pleasure, in PT, becomes 
exceedingly more ambitious so as to aspire towards 
something akin to what was traditionally known as 
metaphysics, or "first philosophy". With the pejo­
rative meaning that Derrida has given the word 
"metaphysics", it is necessary to consider it in the 
sense it is usen by Foucault in his discussion of 
Belov/e1s :ogio uo do sens:
"...Where natural theology contained metaphysical 
illusion in itself and where this illusion was 
always more or less related to natural theology, 
the metaphysics of the phantasm revolves around 
atheism and transgression. Sade and E^taille 
and somewliat later, the palm upturned in a 
gesture of defense and invitation, Roberts.
Moreover, this series of liberated simulacrum 
is activated, or mimes itself, on two privileged 
stages: that of psychoanalysis, which should 
eventually be understood as a metaphysical 
practice since it concerns itself with phantasms; 
and that of the theatre, which is multiplied, 
j-olyscenic, simultaneous, broken into separate
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scenes that refer to each other, and where we 
encounter, without any trace of representation 
(copying or imitating), the dance of masks, the 
cries of bodies, and the gesturing of hands and 
fingers. And throughout each of these two recent 
and divergent series zthe attempt to 1 reconcile 
these series, to reduce them to either perspec­
tive, to produce a ridiculous 6 psychodrama® , 
has been extremely naive), Freud and Artaud 
exclude each other and give rise to a mutual 
resonance * The philosophy of representation - 
of the original, the first time, resemblance, 
imitation, faithfulness - is dissolving; and 
the arrow of the simulacrum released by the 
Epicureans is headed in our direction. It gives 
birth - rebirth - to a 1 phantasmaphysics'
Naturally, the discourse of the lover as it is pre­
sented in LB bases itself on bodies and quaoi-theoreti- 
cxl gestures as signs and as a non-verbal language;
\ its references to an "other" which is ^hvloudly 
not the Other of psychoanalysis, it emphasises the 
illusory character of the other's appearances; therefore, 
this discourse would easily qualify for the categoiy 
■ phantasma physics" .
■ V more importantly, LB shows that the type of theo­
rising encountered in it, as w 11 as in H_ and RB, 
could be extended almost infinitely to other fields 
as well. The significance of LB is thus not so much 
in regard to love or lovers as such, but as ground- 
vork and an example of what can be said within the 
kind of non-representational problematic designated 
by a "phantasmaphysics". bowver, as we have pointed 
out earlier, "love", like "pleasure" too, is not 
a good concept; it has no philosophical or theoretical
rigour and, ar ihe preface states, it is "ignoied,
. 
i
,,165
disparaged" and "iorsal-.en by the surrounding languages 
Nonetheless, it is "spoken, perhaps, by thousands oi 
subjects," 166 and is therefore something of a ubi-
quitous discourse,
i. The "Lover
ig is a record of a lover, but not any lover; certain- 
ly not Barthes. Rather, through a compilation ( 
othir writings indicated by footnotes and proper 
names in the margin of the text, ID strives to re- 
produce the language of the ubiquitous lover. Thus, 
albeit written in the first person, this lover is 
alway- the sum of a number of lovers brought together
through writing.
«I cannot write myself. What, after all, is this
ti» who would write himself? Even as he would
enter the writing, the writing would take the
wind out of his sails, would render him null and
void - futile; a gradual dilapidation would
occur, in which the other's image, too, would
be gradually involved..."
On the next page, as part of the same fragment, a
quote from Jakob Eoehme x s given;
m  xn the sensual language, all minds converge 
together, they need no other^language, for this 
is the language of nature. ’ ”
The lover of ID is therefore, in the first place, 
constituted as such by a "sensual language", alternately 
called the lover’s discourse. Like^the wrlter-reader 
of IT, he is an atopical subject
But the lover is something more physical than the writer 
reader, which is more of a function. How is this 
physical atopos provided? It follows from what Barthes 
calls the "tangle of amorous relations". the object
of the lover's desire is always caught up in a network 
of desires from other lovers or potential lovers. 
"V/erther identifies himself with a madman, 
with the footman. As a reader, I can identify 
myself with Werther. Historically, thousands of 
subjects have done so, suffering, killing them­
selves, dressing, perfuming themselves, writing 
as if they were Werther (songs, poems, candy 
boxes, belt buckles, fans, colognes & la Werther). 
A long cha:n of equivalences links all the lovers 
in the world. /0
The lover*s physical atopos thus ensues from a posi­
tionality within a simple structure of equivalence 
and exchangeability. This structure is so inevitable, 
so immune to influence as to the "persons" of the 
lover that it is likened to a bureaucracy 1f '.
ii. The Cthcr
The other is, in the first instance, unknowable to 
the lover.
n1 am caught in this contradiction: on the one 
hand, I believe I know the other better than 
anyone and triumpantly assert my knowledge to 
the other (*1 know you - I'm the only one who 
really knows you*.! )j and on the other hand, I 
am often struck by the obvious fact that the 
other is impenetrable, not to be found; i cannot 
open up the otuer, trace back the other’s ori­
gins, solve the riddle. Where does the other
come from? Who is the other? I wear myself out,
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I shall never know."
What this contradiction entails, a vacillation be­
tween the best knowledge of the other and complete 
ignorance of him, is that any knowledge is always 
a "projection" on the part of the lover. The moment
of knowledge is based on
"...a kina of evidence in which the game of 
reality and appearance is done away with. I 
am then seized with that exaltation of loving 
someone unkncwn, someone who will remain so 
forever: a mystic impulse: I know what I do not
k n o w . ^
Still another conception of the other is possible, 
namely as
"...a force and not as a person... And 11 I 
were to situate myself as another lorce con!rou­
ting yours? This would nappen: my other would
be defined solely by the suffering or the pleasure
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he affords me."
Thinking of the lover in this way, it is clear tnat 
although love is an erotic flow between bodies, the 
entities in question have nothing to do with the 
persons of humanist thought, but are equally machines, 
consisting of ensembles of organs. The lover is the 
active force, the one who speaKs, and he drowns out 
any discourse that the other might be capable of.
"Xr.e lover’s discourse stifles the otuer, who 
finds no place lor his own language beneath
this massive utterance."1/5 
The other is thus subject to toe vicissitudes of tae 
lover's discursive output; by himself he is not 
capab]e (in the amorous relation, tnat is} of assuming 
any appearance of his own.
It is important to distinguish this lover-other 
relation from subjectivism or a subject-object re­
lation. The lover is not a subject who wells up in 
the world to illumine it with his consciousness, and 
who then interprets the loved object subjectively. Ihe 
lover himself is only an effect of flows of desire 
and of discourse; Barthes gives this striking rendition 
of the lover and his other, suggesting that both
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are disfigured by discourse:
"(The other is disfigured by his persistent 
silence, as in those terrible dreams in which 
a loved person shows up with the lower part, 
of his face quite erased, without any mouth at 
all; and I, the one who speaks, I too am dis­
figured: soliloquy makes me into a monster:
one huge tongue.)"
In the original "one huge tongue' is o: course "une 
enorme langue"^ ^ ', which provides the ne eessary pun 
on language as such.
iii. Love, Jouissance and Zen
In its momentary intensity and explosion of sub^ect- 
hood, there is a mystic aspect to jouissance. Unlike 
jouissance, love is a continual state; no. only has 
it a mystic aspect, but it is thorougc^y pervaded 
with links to mystic thought, especially Zen. Amongst 
the other works in the "Tabula gratulaforia" of 
Fragments ri'un discours amoureux /b, is also to be 
found one of Alan Watts's works on Zen Buddhism.
Apart from that, the text bristles with references 
to Zen. Does tnis not mean that we have to give in 
to Barthes's more hostile critics ana acknowledge 
that the mystique of the text is a tact, and that, 
in trie words of a British i.arxist, tue "still*. # 
essentially privatized, de-politicized notion of 
jouissance,"11 was but the precursor to a full- 
scale d«;generation into mysticism?
Certain naive appropriations of Oriental thought, 
as well as the predominance of Christianity within uhe 
Western mystic tradition, give cause for a theoretical 
distrust of mysticism. However, at least as far as 
Zen is concerned, the following words by Alan V.atts
may prove sobering:
"During the past twenty years there has been
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an extraordinary growth of interest in Zen 
Buddhism... The deeper reason for this interest 
is that the viewpoint of Zen lies so close to 
t the growing edge* of Western thought.
The more alarming and destructive aspects of 
Western civilisation should not blind us to the 
fact that at this very time it is also in one 
of its most creative periods. Ideas and insights 
of the greatest fascination are appearing in 
some of the newer fields of Western science - 
in psychology and psychotherapy, in logic and the 
philosophy of science, in semantics and commu­
nications theory. Some of these developments 
might be due to suggestive influences from 
Asian philosophy, but on the whole I am inclined 
to feel that there is more of a parallelism 
than a direct influence...
...Familiar concepts of space, time, and motion, 
of nature and natural law, of history and social 
change, and of human personality itself have 
dissolved, <*nd we find ourselves adrift without 
landmarks in a universe which more and more 
resembles the Buddhist principle of the 'Great 
Void' .''180
Accordingly, it is hardly exceptional to encounter 
strains of Zen in a contemporary work such as LD.
The amorous subject finds himself in a world in which 
"everything signifies"; to make a telephone call ox 
not, to gesture or not, to speak or not; all of these 
actions will convey something to the other’ '. The
Zen notion of harma is brought to bear on this state
of the lover:
"Karma is the (disastrous) concitenation of
actions (of their causes and their effects).
The Buddhist wants to withdraw from karma; to
suspend the play of causality; he wants to
vacate the signs, to i gnore the practical
question: what is to he done? I cannot stop
asking it, and I sigh after that suspension
of karma which is nirvana. Hence the situations
which happen to impose no responsibility for
behaviour upon me, however painful, are received
Its?in a sort of peace...'*
A concept which is probably of more fundamental
importance to LD, is that of satori. Reading LB, 
forming a picture of the sort of world inhabited by 
the lover, a world of glances, telephone calls, words 
that are elaborate pretenses or evasions rather than 
"communication" in any sense, one forms the impression 
that the lover bases his discourse on a series of 
rather disjointed "moments of awakening", ie. satori1s. 
The notion of tne figure, the basic constituent of 
the amorous discourse, is only in one sense a sign
within that discourse. In another sense the figure
is totally isolated, both temporally and spatially; 
the apprehension of the figure would therefore be 
akin to a ..oment of experiencing the "suchness"11,5 
of a given configuration of limbs, facial as well as 
verbal expressions, and the like.
Satori and the suchness characterising it are usually,
as it can by definition not be explained, illustrated
by means of a short poem or haiku. In his study on
1 A A
Japan, L* empire des signer. ;, Barthes himself gave 
the following account of suchness apropos of the 
haiku:
"Ne decrivant ni ne definissant, le haiku 
(j'appelle ainsi finalement tout trait discon- 
tinu, tout evcnement de la vie japonaise, tel 
qu'il s’offre a mu lecture), le haiku s'amincit 
jusqu* a la pure et seule designation. Cost 
cela, e'eot ainsi, difc le haiku, c* est tel.
Ou raieux encore: Tell dit-il, d'une touche si 
instantinee et si courte (sans vibration ni 
reprise) que la copule y apparaitrait encore 
de trop, comme le remords d'une definition 
interdite, h jamais eloignee. Le sens n’y est 
qu'un flash... mais le flash du haiku n* ec3aire$ 
ne revclc rien; il est celui d'une photographic 
que 1* on prendrait trcs soigneusement (a la 
japonaise), mais en ayant omis de charger 
I1appareil de sa pellicule."^ ^
The photographic simile ("le flash'1 in Krencn usually 
denotes a photographic flash in any case) reiniorces 
our remark concerning the fugure', for figures are like 
photographs in that they entail frozen, instantaneous 
compositions. However, the figure is not a sort of 
mental photograph relating solely to perception in 
an empiricist way — the camera has not been loaded 
anyway, as Barthes says - but a concatenation of 
forces relating to both the lover and the other.
The flash of sator1 would not be a flash radiating 
from the lover towards the otherj it would be an 
omnidireuctonal incandescence.
This notion of a momentary illumination, similar 
to a flash of lightning occurs in various guises 
in both 13 and the various otner texts we have been 
considering. On the one hand, it indicates the concern 
with the instantaneous event, ce it satori, jouienance, 
transgression, intertextual combination, or whaue% cr* 
put on the other hand, these references to light and 
lightning are in themselves shifting signifiers, 
circumlocutions of events that are ultimately beyonu 
language. Althougn they are linked by the leitmotiv 
of such images of light and lightning, it would be 
wrong to reduce these events to each other, ioi they 
are all very different. despite their superficial 
resemblance.
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4. Story of the Eye
a. "The Metaphor of the Eye" Reconsidered
In an essay published in the journal, Critique, in  ^
1963, Barthes gives an analysis of Story of the Eye 
by Bataille. This essay appears as an appendix to the 
English edition of S018/. "The Metaphor of the Eye", 
as it is entitled, enables us to further illustrate 
the discontinuity of earlier texts by Barthes vis_a 
vis the later ones by briefly juxtaposing it with the 
type of reading advocated by the texts we have been 
considering.
"The Metaphor of the Eye", unlike the protracted 
discussion on pornography by Susan Sontag also in­
cluded in SO, is exemplary; it is both subtle and 
powerful, delineating metaphoric - as opposed co 
metonymic, in Jakobson1s distinction - series in 
SO. The essay is also uncitniaoly structural, in the 
sense that the metaphoric chains described in it traverse 
the space of the novel in a definite way, indepen. f rt 
of this specific reading. In short, by enumerating 
the metaphoric links connecting, firstly, eyes/eggs 
and, secondly, weeping/urinating, the essay enunciates 
a truth, ascertained by linguistic and therefore 
scientific means, about the novel.
If that were, however, all that "The Metaphor of the 
Eye" had to offer, we need not have mentioned it, 
if not relegated it to the scrapheap of criticism.
But in its brief attentions to that which eludes 
a structural gaze, ic. v ich can only be defined 
in vague, unscientific terms in the essay - even 
though these terms occur within a scientific
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analysis - it displays an inchoate receptivity towards 
textual pleasure. Which is not to say that we wish 
to trace iT, RB and ID hack to this or any other 
essay; it is rather a case of the structural method 
revealing its own inadequacy when it comes to non- 
realistic, disturbed texts such as SO. Compare, for 
example, the ambiguity of this description:
•'But if we call metonymy this transfer of meaning 
from one chain to the other at different levels 
of metaphor (the 'eye sucked like a breast’, 
•drinking my left eye between her lips') we 
shall probably concede that Bataille s eroticism 
is essentially metonymic. Since the poetic 
technique employed here consists in demolishing 
the usual contiguities of objects and substit­
uting fresh encounters that are nevertheless 
limited by the persistence of a single theme 
within each metaphor, the result is a general 
contagion of qualities and actions: by virtue 
of their metonymic freedom they endlessly exchange 
meanings and usages in such a way that breaking 
eggs in a bath tub , swallowing or peeling eggs 
(soft-boiled;, cutting up or putting out an eye 
or using one in sex play, associating a saucer 
of milk with a cunt or a beam of light with a 
jet of urine, biting the bull's testicle like 
an egg or inserting it in the body - all these 
associations are at the same time identical and 
other, for the metaphor that varies them exhi­
bits a controlled difference between them that 
the metonymy that interchanges them immediately 
sets about abolishing. The world becomes blurred; 
properties are no longer separate; spilling, 
sobbing, urinating, ejaculating form a wavy 
meaning, and the wnole of Story oi’_ the nye 
signifies in the manner of a vibration that l8g 
alwavs gives the same sound (but wnat sound?)."
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Although, the characterisation of the elfects of the 
various objects in the text is given as the metonymic 
interchange of metaphors, this very analysis becomes 
stretched and disrupted by the semantic and episte- 
" mological contradictions it is enunciating; the notion 
of a "wavy meaning” suddenly occurs within the other­
wise lucid and controlled discourse. The question 
arises: apart from merely naming it linguistically, 
how can the latter be described or charted in a more 
direct and detailed manner?
Clearly, within the structural problematic of "The 
Metaphor of the Eye", that waviness and sonic vibra­
tion alluded to in the above passage, constitutes 
an exterior of the text of which it has a vague 
apprehension, but wnich falls beyond its field 
intelligibility.
With a non-transgressive text, even if it is not 
realistic, a structural analysis may patiently 
circumscribe the space of the text, enumerate its 
matrixes, individualo metaphors and metonymies, find 
the fixed relationships between its eleme... s.
But with a text such as HO which is violent and 
excessive as to its language and distribution of struc­
tural elements (eg. the metaphoric cnain of eyes/eggs/ 
testicles also has a distinctly transgressive function), 
a structural discourse, especially where it is appen­
ded to a text of this kind, strikes us as being some­
what amiss, in a not uncomical way. it is like someone 
remarking, after witnessing an extremely ghastly 
car accident in whicu several people died, "Did you 
notice that both the right hand tail lights of the cars 
sustained a relatively horizontal crack in them?" 
Admittedly, the fact that "The Metaphor of the Eye" 
completely omits, unlike Susan Sontag*n pedestrian
and typically Anglo-Saxon analysis of "literary 
pornography", any particular reference to the "sexual 
content" of SO, has a critical allure ail of its own. 
For to cal.L, like Sontag, attention to the "porno­
graphic nature of t ; text", despite her apology 
that "pornography" is a label which she is not pre- 
ad to uphold in court' %  and then to define texts 
like it as a literary variety of this dubious cate­
gory, is only one step removed from the philistine 
pur'" t ;nisni which would censure SO as being porno­
graphic regardless of literary nicet cs.
In a review that otherwise displays a similar em-
barassment apropos of "pornography’1 to Sontag1 s
essay, Lem Coley makes the following point:
"Place, for example, Georges Bataillc1s erotic
novel, Story of tne Eye, first published in 1923,
next to works by Hemingway or Fitzgerald from
the same period. The comparison is less perverse
than it sounds. Story of the Lye has the sana-
torturns and the incest of Tender is the Fight,
the bullfights of The Sun Also Rises, and the
international rich - found in both American
novels - who cruise Lurope lor sexual adventure.
But Bataille* s bullfight is not Hemingway's:
'First, Simone bit into one of the raw
balls, to my dismay, then Granero advanced
toward the bull, waving his scarlet cloth;
finally, almost at once, Simone, with a
blood-red face and a suffocating lewdness,
uncovered har long white thighs up to
her moist vulva, into which she slowly
and surely fitted the second pale globule -
Granero was thrown back by the bull and
wedged against the balustrade... at the
third blow, one horn plunged into the
190right eye and through the head.'"
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Although Coley lapses into a rather familiar "co-option" 
argument erotic literature, the latter
passage conveys a fundamental problem concomitan 
with SO, namely how to differentiate it from other 
literature. Even on a prima facie lever, SO diilerB 
quite radically from anything published by Hemingway 
or Fitzgerald, and has equally dissimilar effects 
m  us. To say that the difference lies with its 
sexual depictions evades the issue, for do not other 
literary works deal with sexual activity in a more 
or less"explicit way? If explicitness is our concern 
here, how is it quantified? Do we count the so-called 
four letter words? Even if we accept the nothing less 
than preposterous assumptions of the "sexual" argu­
ment, it still remains to differentiate something 
like SO from the less literary permutations ofporno­
graphy, This is not a new debate, by any means , 
and it would not serve any purpose for us to reiterate
|t here.
auffice it to say that, bjr virtue of the type of 
language encountered in it - even if we are so theo- 
retically crude as to define it purely in terms of 
"sex" - SO is different. We can analyse it structu- 
rally, as in "The metaphor of the Eye" or comment on 
its position within the pornographic order witnout 
however touching upon this difference in any satis- 
factory or meaningful way. In this respect, the task 
if it is not entirely presumptuous to assign it a 
task - of the tneory of pleasure would be to define for 
us the subtlety and the specificity of this difference. 
Xi is suited to this exactly because it concerns itself 
not with genres, themes and the like, nor with the 
asensual, cerebrally discerned structures of a work, 
but with the sensual, momentary, material flow of the
i-ovi. n a microcosmic way
Whence the choice of SO to illustrate the theory of
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pleasure in critical practice, 
b. : -
One of the most obvious postulates o : >. 
following:
"The text of pleasure is not necess ■ *-. 
text tnat recounts pleasures; vhe ex 
jcuissance is never the text that recounts 
the kind of jouissance afforded ii -era- : .• 
an ejaculation. The pleasure of rcpresentau 
is not attached to its object: pornography in 
not sure. In zoological terms, one could say 
that the site of textual pleasure is not the 
relation of mimic and model (imitative era 
but solely that ci aupe and mimic (reravju c: 
desire, of production)♦"
Jouissance not having any direct connection with 
representational accounts of ejaculations, erg -# 
etc., it is obvious that even when we ex erience 
textual jouissance upon reading about a charactc; 
in iw attaining orga; ., that jour, sance is a t m  Du- 
table to a split in the reading, and not to the 
elements of representational eroticism in the text.
A text such as kobce-vriilc-t* s Je i^'■'Pd. * c!
a well-known example, which contains aosolutely no 
eroticism which could be remotely dWmecl to oe 
"explicit" from a representational pXintoi viev., 
is nonetheless potentially a "text of jouissance 
on a par with SO.
In wh&t way does the depiction of sexual excess in 
a text therefore lend itself to vouissance, xf at all: 
Again, the jouissance of the erotic text is bound up 
with transgression. Through erotic excess, the limiVB 
o-r mnralitv ana religious taboos are announced
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violated in the same stroke: these transgressions 
also entail systematic splits, and therefore eruptions 
of jouissance. Within the West, the religious system 
whicn holds the Christian God to be sacred, also 
defines as one of its taboos, blasphemy, the inverse 
of praising God, ie. desecrating him. In our reading 
of SO below, we shall attempt to detail the specific 
production of pleasure concomitant with blasphemy.
For the moment, we need merely stress a few well- 
known motifs, namely that our reading machine, 
the quasi-subject who partakes of textual pleasure, 
is a matrix, a space for noting the play and break­
down of systems and textual or discursive productions. 
He, she or it is criss-crossed, inter alia, by the 
system of Christian, as well as sexual, taboos, in 
addition to the various discourses that aim, or have 
been aiming* at reducing the pervasiveness of Christ­
ianity, such as mrxisrn* or the spread of supposed 
sexual freedom. Christianity is by no means as dead 
a dog as some enligntened ciitics, amongst whom 
Coley154, would like to think. Fou&ult's current 
project has been underlining the development of tne 
Christian ordering of pleasure around sin and fallen 
bodies, through various discursive permutations, 
into the "sexual freedom" and "open" discourses on
mi'i
sex of the recent past
Whether a given reading subject is a libertine or 
a minister of religion - not to mention the fact that 
libertinism is dependent on such religiously derived 
notions as incest, bestiality and the like - is 
immaterial: although the effects in either of tnem 
will be dissimilar, neither is immune to being caught 
up in the textual production which, in the case of 
the erotic text, is of a potentially disruptive order 
Even boredom, we may recall, is merely the aosence 
of .iouissance.
I
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it literally describes instances of puissance.
c . Two Peadinss:. and .£^ - ^ S R
b T w r n a U r Z d L  oultune,
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... jent of an individual or subjective reading ex- 
perience.
H = ; s = = s = r
" iouissance (and bis reader)
begins the untenable text, the impossible text. 
This text is outside criticism, unless lt_is 
-inched tbrou"'' another text of Jouissanoe: 
you cannot speak 'on- such a text, you can 
only speak 'in' it, InJtBtoshion. enter into
a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm
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repeat the letter of pleasurej.
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Is SO a text of jouissance or a text of pleasure?
Of course, it depends on the production, the specific 
reading. "The Metaphor of the iiye" was capable of 
reporting on the text as if it were a text of pleasure, 
yet at the same time allowed us a glimpse of where 
it starts to break down into wavy meaning; stall 
such a glimpse constitutes a report on jouissance: 
the breakdown does not occur within the critical
text.
Perhaps a prototype of a spoken reading has already 
been offered by Kristeva in her 'reading of Sellers' s 
H200. It is a text within a text, an infusion of her 
"heterogeneous" body into the body of the text; in 
its analytical aspects the text is also the unwinding 
in self-analytical fashion of Kristeva' s body.
"Words cone to mind, but they are fussy, signi- 
f-yiRg nothing, more throbbing than meaning, 
and their stream goes to our breasts, genitals 
and irridescent skin* That could be all there is 
to it - an 'anonymous waite conflict as they 
said in the nineteenth century. But what would 
be the point? how this is the point: my concern 
lies in the other, what is heterogeneous, my 
own negation erected as representation, but 
tne consumption of which 1 can also decipher. 
This heterogeneous object is of course a body 
that invites me tr Identify with it (woman, 
child, androgyne?) and immediately forhids any 
identification; it is not me, it is a non-me 
in me, beside me, outside of me, where the me 
becomes lost. This heterogeneous object is a 
body, because it is a text. I have written 
down this much abused word and insist upon it 
cn that vou mi Fit t understand how much risk there
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is in a text, how much nonidentity, nonauthen- 
ticity, impossibility, and corrosiveness it 
holds lor those who chose to see themselves 
within it. A body, a text that bounces back 
to me echoes of a territory that 1 have lost 
but that I am seeking within the blackness of 
dreams in Bulgarian, French, Russian, Chinese 
tones, invocations, lifting up the dismembered, 
sleeping body... So I listen to the black, 
heterogeneous body/text; I coil my jouissance 
within it, I cast it off, I sidestep its own, 
in a cold fire where murder is no longer the 
murder of the other, but rather, of the other 
wno thought she was 1, of me who thought I w, s 
the other, of me, you, us - of personal pro­
nouns therefore, which no longer have much to
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do with all this."
In order to demonstrate the two forms of critical 
writing, one "reported" and one "spoken", we shall 
offer two readings of SO.
i. 1he Re nort,d 0 c ad in g
SO is a surreal text, not because its author had 
association; with the Surrealist movement, but inter- 
text ually. Certain images within the text can be 
appreciated as surreal ones only on the basis of 
having seen pal-.tings by, especially, Magritte,
De Chirico and hareel Duchamp, as well as the films
, , ,201 
of Buis Bunucl
Thus, the very graphic scenes in Chapter 5, after 
the narrator and Simone had visited harcolle in the 
lunatic asylum, the two of them pedalling on a 
bicycle, naked except for their shoes in a "rainless 
tempest"205, have a decidedly surreal allure. Making 
the transposition literal, these scenes exemplify
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the objective huino u r of surrealism, of which Andi o
Breton wrote in 1936:
"..tobjective huvour, a synthesis in tne Hegelian
sense of the imitation of nature in its acci­
dental forms on the one hand and oi humour 
on the other. Humour, as a paradoxical triumph 
of the pleasure principle over real conditions
at a moment v/iien they may be considered to be
204
particularly unfavourable..."
The bicycle tco, becomes a surreal sign: we are 
reminded of Duchamp's ^mous readymade, Bicycle
To read SO is to activate a surreal transposition.
Not only the bicycle, but other objects, the eyes,
the eggs, the small pair 01 scissors used by Jii
Edmund, as well as the motifs of urine, blood <^ na
dreams, display an enigmatic quality deriving 0.2 0.. thio
transposition between tne text and paintings 01 xilr-s
or sculutur• s. (In ;,uuu 1 ’ s j.o m e n  ,-.:.d:..o_u, on which
Dali collaborated, an eye is similarly cut out to
that of t»»e pri( Sv in be. j has is, of course, no v
limited to paint in.; , i -1ms or sculptures vhat are
associated with surroaeis- -, but includes any tiling
that we as reading subjects nave been exposea to.
The reason why the strangeness of these objects and
motifs is so recognisable is, however, particularly
du- to what has been called the "entire Bada and
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Surrealist curt or objects."
These objects, although enigmatically surreal, are 
also signs. SO, as Barthes correctly observes in 
"The Metaphor of the Bye", is the history of an ob­
ject, the eye' \ The eye and its various near or full 
homophones are signs recurring throughout tne text, 
but signs of what? What does the eye signify, apart
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from sight itself? In this respect, SO is a text in 
the sense that we have given to this word: it is a 
texture, a weaving of signif-iers without (Ixxea) 
slnifieds. The eye signifies sight signifies xignt 
signifies... and the process of signification extends 
itself along a continuum of possibilities withouv 
any one being definite 01 iinal.
Similarly, the eye and its homophones cannot be 
considered as if they constituted the "structure" 
of the text. The play on oeil, oeuf, .les yeux and 
les oeufs do not form a constant pattern in the 
text, although eyes, eggs and testicles are put to 
all sorts of erotic usages. These are neither consis­
tent, nor very clear if we think, for instance, of 
Simone biting into the testicle of the bull: the 
symbolism of the act is distorted, for the mataaors 
usually eat the testicles cooked to augment their 
virility whereas Simone eats it raw and has, as a 
woman, no virility. Furthermore, the play on. oeir 
and oeuf is sometimes confused by aho" or pun on 
un, a numeral or indci inite ar lice* • tr-. ( u^
of keeping with the other signs relating vo oojecus.
Thus, despite the chain of objects that we c o u Ilu 
possibly discern, no meanings or significances tan  
neatly into place; the chain assumes the appearance 
of, precisely, a game, leading nowhere.
A certain commonplace view of the textual "gap" would 
have it that a pun, such as those we have just men­
tioned, constitutes a gap per sc, centred on tm. 
particular word in question. Of course, this is an 
oversimplification, for the ambiguity of the basic 
pun never exists on a purely lexical level, but is 
always determined by the paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
orders in which the word occurs. Therefore the series
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of puns, or as in the French, jeu de mots, a play 
on words, in SO do not in itself effect "gape” or 
"splits" in the text. Rather, this word play is 
used destructively, and through the semantic and 
other lacerations they impose on the text, produce 
gaps, splits, etc.
Apart from the destructiveness of the shifting of
meanings that the word play entails, it parodies
the supposed sexv.il transgressiveness of the text.
Ideed, it makes a mockery of fontag's statement that
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"pornography cannot parody itself" ". (Sontag takes 
"characters" and "conventions" as reference points, 
and not the text or its language, but ultimately 
it is still her acceptance of the "pornographic" 
category that allows her the somewhat facile para­
doxicality of:
"Pornography is a theatre of types, never -f 
individuals. A parody of pornography, so far 
as it has any real competence, always remains
porno:rrap:.’V . Jntir.t.a, parody is one common lorm
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of pornographic writing."
The word play call s attention to the status oi the 
text and the objects and actions in it, as "mere 
words", uttered in a game not to be taken seriously, 
and not to be offended by.
But while the word play achieves this effect, the 
intertext which includes all of morality relating 
to sex and the sanctity and worth of human life, 
preserves the transgressiveness of the text, makes 
it "shocking"> "dirty", "disgusting", to name a few 
moralistic cliches, regardless of the tone of humour 
and verbal invention in the text. The dichotomy 
between an intentextually transposed humanism of 
erotic pleasure and the dignity and value of human 
beings, and the marvellously jocular and innocent
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narrative of SO, would constitute one of the most
pervasive splits of the text and by definition a
great source, if it is not a malapropism for it to
have a source, of jouissance. When the priest is
killed, and his eye inserted into Simone’s "slobbery
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flesh, in the midst of the fur" , we laugh in 
jouissance.
It follows that if SO is a 'polyvalent" text, it 
does not specifically derive from its major - to 
avoid introducing the structural coherence implicit 
in the term "central" - pun. Its polyvalence ra her 
emanates from the variety of narrative tones and 
multiplicity of spaces in the text, as well as the 
great intertcxtual play-off of moral and intellectual 
(re. artistic, literary) systems. In places 50 pre­
figures in an eminently more subtle way, the obvious 
and contrived cpistemological contradictions - pitting 
themselves precisely against realism in on implicit 
reference for the "given" and "naturalness" of the
form - that h a w  become the rather hackneyed hallmark
Ellof much contemporary, especially American , so-called 
fiction.
"Very soon, of .,ovrsc, her mother, who might 
enter the villa parlour at any moment, did 
catch us in our unusual act. but still, the 
first time this fine woman stumbled upon us, 
she was content, despite having led an exemplary 
life, to gape wordlessly, so that we did not 
notice a thing. I suppose sue was too flabber­
gasted to speak, aut when wc were done and trying 
to clean up the mess, we noticed her standing 
in the doorway.
•Pretend there's no one there,' Simone told me 
and she went on wiping her behind.
And indeed, wc blithely strolled out as though
the woman had bee.i reduced to a lanii^y
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portrait."
Although the text, as do certain contemporary ones, 
goes not so far as to literally erase Simone-’ s 
mother out of the scene by describing her fading 
image, it nevertheless by means of the portrait 
image indicates its own 11 frame1 i the tenuous and 
arbitrary demarcation between a ,ffictional*' space 
and a "real-life" one. Of course, this is yet another 
textual split. And again, it derives from the Interte. 
that accords a significance to framer and windows 
in texts or, especially, paintings; Magritte* s 
canvases are full of them, amongst which la cl6 des 
champs" , showing a window frame with a broken pane, 
with some of the sky and trees of the scene outside 
still imprinted on the jagged glass inside.
Through such a manoeuvre, the text displays the 
conditions of its own production, and the illusory 
quality of its representational effects. Apart from 
this intertextually produced significance of the 
frame, such an episode, together with the play of 
meanings productive of op-its in the Text, have 
the effect of erasing the boundaries that would 
fix the text within definable limits, epistemologic- 
ally) morally and otherwise. It becomes limitless 
in the sense of an open field, traversable from many 
sides and in various directions. This open-endedness 
could also be related to the not'on of a transgression 
of transgression.
If SO were just a limitless overstepping of, say, 
moral limits or norms regarding novelistic structure, 
the text would have constituted a very mild form 
of semi-transgression. But the way minute pleasures 
in the form of stylistic oddities and ironies that are
distributed through the text transgress the more 
grandiose normative transgressions in their turn, 
makes for such ; multiple form of active self-trans­
gression. In the above quotation, we could discern 
a series of transgressions, apart from the already 
mentioned epistemological de-framing. There is the 
obvious horror that must be experienced by Simone's 
mother, who in her silence personifies an outraged 
body of principles evoked by the term, traditions] 
morality. We have said earlier in our remarks on 
transgression that it entails a silence signifying 
the end or the limit of meaning; the silence of 
the mother, her wordless gaping, would in this sense 
signify the transgression of her system and. her 
language. The humorous tone of the text at this 
point, however, as elsewhere, effects a de-moralising 
pleasurable transgression of the moral transgression.
These transgressions, according to our earlier 
definition of the concept, ultimately pertain to 
culture. Also in another respect does culture in 
the broad sense provide for a split in oO that is 
productive of pi"asure, namely in that throughout 
the text the "two edges" spoken of in FI" % a 
"conformist" one and a "mobile blank" one, operate. 
Still within the context of the above passage from 
SO, the grammatical correctness, style, comprehensi­
bility, etc. of the text constitutes the "conformist" 
edge. The "mobile and blank" edge would be the plastx 
ally changing effects of the passage, the very spe­
cific "contours"" 'J assumed by these effects; in this 
case, the effects would include the transgressive 
elements. The pleasure of the text is rightly to 
be found in the disparity, or split, between the 
two edges, being the site of our desire and the 
genuinely erotic aspect of the text.
SO also exemplifies the play between the doxic and
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paradoxical very well. In essence, the text is 
one large paradox, a relentless assault on normality 
or the aght and behaviour. Strangely enough, the #
text can only be read ap paradoxical if one takes 
the doxi,' , riously, if is outraged by sexual 
licence arl murder; for a real-life sadist, the text 
would be in certain if not all respects, his doxa.
Bataille has commented on this elsewhere, saying
about the doctrine of sadism,
"Obviously, if it were taken seriously, no
society could accept it for a single instant. 1
Indeed, those people who used to rate De ie
as a scoundrel responded better to his intentions
than his admirers do in our own day: De oade
invokes indignation and protest, otherwise the
paradox of pleasure would be nothing but a
poetic fancy. I repeat that I prefer to discuss
him only with people who are revolted by him, |
and from their point of view.
In another Eataillean text, h.adame kdwarda, which J
transposes itself into our reading of SO, these words I
occur before it as e motto:
"Si tv. as peur de tcut, lis ce livre, nais
d’abord, ecoute-moi: si tu ris, c'est que tu J
as peur. bn livre, 11 semble, est chose 
inerte. C’est possible. It pourtant, si comme 
il arrive, tu ne sais pas lire? devrais-tu
redouter...? fis-tu seul? as-tu froid? sais-tu j
jusqu'a quel point 1’homme est 'toi-mgrne'? 
imbecile? et nu? 1 1
Clearly, if one is to laugh at sadistic texts in 
a blas6 and typically contemporary manner, their 
impact is lost# In other words, it is only by 
affirming a moral doxa that may be long lost t.iat the 
paradoxicality of SC is thrown into relief. Thus the 
etymolosical play inhering in jeradoxa, a closeness
I
1
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to the doxa, must also be maintained in any reading 
oi SO that aims to be attentive to its paradoxicaii- 
tics. For, as the motto to i.adame F.dwarda attests, 
to shrug off the sadistic syllogism of desire that 
must be freed to the point of annihilation, is wo 
repress a fundamental knowing, a primordial horror 
without which the paradox of these texts is lost.
In order to free this paradox from being trapped 
in the advance of a permissive doxa, it is necessary 
to identify strenuously with the morose figure of 
Simone* s mother and her speechless horror at the 
spectacle of the transgressions of the youths:
«A few days later, however, when Simone was 
doing gymnastics with me in the rafters o_ 
a garage, she pissed on her mother, who had 
the misfortune to stop underneath without seeing 
her. The sad widow got out of the way and gazeo 
at us with such dismal eyes and such a desperate 
expression that sne egged us on...
Simone's mother would be, in the playful Barthesian 
sense of the Imaginary as both literally "an Imagined 
and the unconscious relation to a counterpart, our 
imaginary c-lf in a pleasurable textualisution of 
SO: it would be both a conscious and unconscious 
Identification with her. Conscious, because in our 
desire to gain pleasure from the text, cc activate 
its paradoxicality, we have to force ourselves into 
a prudish role; unconsciously, due to the fact that 
our liberal condonation and permissiveness, our 
laughing in terms of the hdwarda motto, is but the 
effect of an unconscious horror deriving from ow. 
Imaginary, ie. that jumble of sympathies and identi­
fications with our other counterparts, in this case 
both the mother and the two youths. We are horrified 
on behalf of the mother, the doxic structure, and 
we share the glee of the youths, the paradoxical 
structure.
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Despite Bontag's contention that erotic texts arc 
capable of arousing the reader sexually' , tne pleasure 
of a text such as is, as v/e have demonstrated, 
certainly net connected with arousal on account of 
descriptions of erotic activity: such arousal would 
proceed from a representational experience of the 
text. Textual pleasure being polymorpnously perverse, 
it may be equally produced by a certain placing 01 
commas and fyll-stops, the lengths of sentences, a 
given adjective or other stylistic element. Pleasure, 
as stressed repeatedly, is produced by the body and 
not by the mind or intellect. When we read SO, pleasure 
encompasses both the most basic physical awareness, 
such as the weight of one's buttocks on the chair, 
as well as the infinitely detailed sensation of 
recording the spatial multiplicities of tne text, 
the images and meanings conjui up by a series o-i 
sign!tiers operating on a changing scale of levels, 
and the extremely individual intertextual combinations 
that will never repeat '..r.erils - es.
As it is difficult to convey the latter process 
without annotating tne whole of JX, a n  tne 
jouissance of the text is completely beyond the 
field of a "reported reading", the next section 
will have to suffice as the final albeit inconne vu 
rendering of both an experience of jouissance and 
a specific production of pleasure, in turn to be 
read elsewhere and produced under different con­
ditions.
ii. The Spoken Heading
He, she, it reads/writes:
"She had black silk stockings on covering her 
knees, but I was unable to see as far up as the 
cunt (this name, which I always used with Simone, 
is I think, by far the loveliest of the names
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for the vagina). It merely struck me that by 
slightly lifting the pinafore from behind,
I might see her private parts unveiled.
Mow in the corner of a hallway there was a 
saucer of milk for the cat. •Milk is for the 
pussy, isn't it?' said Simone. 'Do you dare 
me to sit in the saucer:
‘I dare you,' I answered, almost breathless.
The day was extremely hot. Simone put the saucer 
on a small bench, planted herself before me, 
and, with her eyes fixed on me, she sat down 
without my being able to see her burning buttocks 
under the skirt, dipping into the cool milk.
The blood shot to my head, and I stood before 
her awhile, immobile and trembling, as she 
eyed my stiff cock bulging in my trousers.
Then I lay down at her feet without stirring, 
and for the first time, 1 saw her 'pin* and 
dark' flesh cooling in the white milk. We re- 
mained motionless, both of us equally over-
v. 1 , H 2 20whelmed...”
ool't ig a pleasurable adjective. As Simone's unseen 
issy is lowered into the milk, we find the text 
, be, as in the American slang, "cool". (We are 
.80 lowered into the text, starting to read.)
ie must also not be oblivious to the play of contra- 
ictions inherent in the situation. Simone and the 
arrator are related, thereby initially invoking 
paradigm of an "innocent" familial gathering of 
ousins. Simone is also wearing a pinafore with 
tarched white collar221, somewhat staid and unprovo- 
ATmarel. The narrator cannot see her nakedness
underneath; he merely wishes for it. The situation, 
their clothes and their statements have a double 
edge: one normal, bourgeois, and the other radical, 
incestuous and perverse. Simone’s words, 11' Milk is 
for the pussy, isn't it?"', were it not for .the 
perverse edge proceeding from the pun on lait» 
would have been an entirely accurate and cousin­
like observation about the saucer of milk.
Chain of interlingual connectors: lait (French) is 
milk, but also slang for semen; milk is for the 
pussy, ie. cat, a metaphor for Simone's vagina and 
another slang word; in Afrikaans "poes” means cunt, 
derived from the butch for "cat"; Dutch slang for 
semen is "pap", giving rise to the common phrase 
in Afrikaans, "pap en melk". So the signifiers are 
jumbled by his available lexicon, the inadequacy of 
translation lending itself to random interlingual 
interferences.
On page 24 of SO, the asyl.ua in which Karcelle is kept, 
is referred to as "a bogus ch&teau de plaisance", 
again playing on cat (chat) and water (eau); water 
finds, of course, its place amongst the liquid 
leitmotivs of milk, tears and urine.
The language of is exuberant. Even in its most 
intense or violent moments, it is full of joy, 
oblivious of the maudlin and moralistic discourses 
that define horror, sympathy, shame or sorrow.
"I remember that one day, when we were in a 
car tooling along at top speed, we crashed 
into a cyclist, an apparently very young and 
very pretty girl. Her head was almost Totally 
ripped off by the wheels. For a long time, we 
were parked a few yards beyond without getting 
out, fully absorbed in the sight of the corpse. 
The horror and despair at so much bloody flesh,
nauseating in part, and in part very beautiful, 
was fairly equivalent tc our usual impression 
upon seeing one another. Simone was tall and 
lovely. She was usually very natural, there 
was nothing heartbreaking in her eyes or hei
One enjoys the language of SO like enjoying the 
beauty of a lacerated body; of course, ultimately, 
the text is just that. There is no place for negative 
forces, only a positive, affirmative joy in writing 
the text. The "1", personal pronoun, of the text’s 
anonymous narrator becomes the eye ol Got. witnessing 
our transgression, which is the same eye by which we 
see Bin/"' ^. O r I's and eyes plugged into the eye's 
tale, a flow of sight is produced, wnich is intersected 
at various points by other fluxes, those of pleasure, 
desire and intertextuality. I.y is bathed m  an
expanding fluxus, expanding according to the principle 
by which contemporary physicists explain the becoming 
of the universe. (In writing t exts, • isc *; ^ >
categories are discarded; theories enter the writing 
in an open bricola. e.)
An eye is cut loose in S'-  ^ . It is a sphere a.ieed 
from itself, in tue sense that a sphere is also a 
context. This liberation is made possible by death, 
(vhich functions as the type of break that would 
constitute a transgression. The visit of tee fly
signifies this break:
"All at once, Simone uttered a soft cry. Some­
thing bizarre and quite baifling had happened, 
this time, the insect had perched on the corpse's 
eye and was agitating its long nightmarish 
legs on the strange orb. The girl took her 
head in her hands and shook it, trembling, 
then she seemed to plunge into an acyrs of
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.225reflections.11 
Simone, like the eye is going to do within moments, 
is taking a plunge. The loosened eye, no longer seeing, 
is made to wander. Sir Edmund rolls the eye between 
the bodies of Simone and the "I"; it. is inserted 
into the various orifices of Simone6 s body.
Through the killing of the priest, symbol of a Christian 
idealism, the eye is given a materiality that enables 
it to form connections with bodies in an erotic game.
In the head of the priest, the eye functions as a 
receptacle for an idealistically conceived "reality" 
of God's creation: it receives the world in the pa­
ssive way that the priest listens to Simone's con­
fession. The loosened eye, on the other band, is 
capable of forming a connection that produces a 
sensation:
"The caress of the eye over the skin is 
utterly, so extraordinarily gentle, and the
sensation is so bizarre that it has something . |
of a rooster's horrible crowing. 
by means of the rooster metaphor, which previously 
surfaced apropos i f ..arcello's associations 1, tne 
sensation of tne eye in contact with the skin is |
displaced into textual jouissance.
i
The religiously symbolic identification that we 
made a moment ago, like all textual identifications, 
was of course a fleeting one without any particular 
validity, for only a page or two later, Simone,
Sir r dm void and the "1" don priestly garb themselves:
"Sir Edmund evinced a humorous ingenuity in 
these circumstances: thus we marcaed down the 
main street of the small town of Ronda, he and 
I dressed as Spanish priests, wearing the small 
hairy felt hats and priestly cloaks, and man­
fully puffing on big cigars; as for Simone,
.8
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who was walking between us in the cosiume of
a Seville seminarist, she looked more angelic
228than ever."
So the text proceeds by a constant disruption 01 
identities. The adjective, "angelic", applied to the 
supremely erotic figure of Simone is in i s humorous 
paradoxicality cause for an eruption of jouissance.
Simone, the whore who refuses to make love like a 
"housewife and mother",
"‘You're totally insane, little man,' she cried,
'I'm not interested - here, in a bed like this,
like a housewife and mother'. I'll only do .t
22S
with Karcelle'.' " 
and Simone the angel, belie these womanly archetypes 
altogether. Rather, she is the incarnation of an 
erotic madness, driven by wild and insatiable desires, 
her desires do not fix her into a .ual positionality„ 
her desire for the "I" does not make of her a hetero­
sexual woman, nor docs her lusting after harceile make 
of her a lesbian; her body also elicits pleasure irom 
eyes ana eggs. Her desires are not solely to re under­
stood in tor-ms of 3' bcrtinage in -mould of, say, 
Sade’s libertines, for she arranges erotic situations 
and objects in an extremely poetic way.
Simone is released into the space of SO much like 
the eye is cur loose from its socket. Her name 
itself plays on C'est mon oeuf/oeil. She is not 
a character, but a transformation principle that con­
stantly poeticises and eroticises words, objects 
and situations. She is my eye, the open eye of the 
text through which spaces, pleasures, surreal land­
scapes, the dance of words and erotically charged 
bodies radiate. Everywhere that she goes* some osten­
sibly inconsequential feature of her environment is 
turned into a source of pleasure: this feature becomes 
an image in a continuous erotic poeticisation.
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”Simone had found a mud puddle, and was smearing 
herself wildly: she was jerking off with tne
earth and coming violently, whipped by the
2'60downpour.. "
The earth too becomes a body to form an erotic con­
nection with; the rain "whips" her as if the whole of 
nature participates in a sado-masochistic act.
In various instances in SO, the sun, the sky, etc., 
are related to the motif of urination, coming, ejacu­
lation, weeping, ie. all the bodily activities that 
entail a liquid flow. For example, the Milky 
Way is referred to as "that strange breach of astral 
sperm and heavenly urine"251, whereas Andalusia is 
iia country of yellow earth and yellow s/.y, to^.\ eyes 
an immense chamberpot flooded with sunlight" *
Such images are very pertinent to the spatial aspects 
of the text as a whole. The space flows, gushes forth 
with profusions of intense and colouri ul image.,; 
this spatial flow is sometimes interrupted by moments 
of repose, as if the surrounding natural body v/vi c 
recuperating from either orgasm or urinary release. 
The relationship between the bodily climaxes of the 
human figures and the flow of elemental properties 
or images pertaining to nature is sometimes one of 
correspondence, as at the end of Chapter 1, quoted 
above, where Simone's erotic gratifications coincide 
with the pouring tin and lightning, but ac other 
times relative peace "outside" witnesses some form 
of erotic intensity in the human bodies.
"At last, one day at six, when the oblique 
sunshine was directly lighting the batnroom, 
a half-sucked egg was suddenly invaded by the 
water, and after filling up with a bizarre 
noise, it was ship-wrecked belore our very 
eyes. This incident was so extraordinarily 
meaningful to Simone that her body tautened
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..Simone had found a mud puddle, and was smearing
herself wildly: she was jerking off with the
earth and coming violently, whipped by the 
,,2)0
downpour...
rh e  earth too becomes a body to form an erotic con- 
nection with; the rain "whips" her as if the whole of 
nature participates in a sado-masochistic act.
In various instances in SO, the sun, the sky, etc., 
are related to the motif of urination, coming, ejacu-
lation, weeping, ie. all the bodily activities that
entail a liquid flow. For example, the Milky 
Way is referred to as "that strange breach of astral 
sperm and heavenly urine"?^^ whereas Andalusia is 
"a country of yellow earth and yellow sky, to^ny eyes 
an immense chamberpot flooded with sunlight"
Such images are very pertinent to the spatial aspects 
of the text as a whole. The space flows, gushes forth 
with profusions of intense and colourful images; 
this spatial flow is sometimes Interrupted by moments 
of repose, as if the surrounding natural body were 
recuperating from either orgasm or urinary release.
The relationship between the bodily climaxes of the
human figures and the flow of elemental properties
or images pertaining to nature is sometimes one of
correspondence, as at tne end of Chapter 1, quoted
above, where Simone’s erotic gratifications coincide
with the pouring rain and lightning, but at other j
times relative peace "outside" witnesses some form
of erotic intensity in the human bodies.
"At last, one day at six, when the oblique 
sunshine was directly lighting the bathroom, 
a half-sucked egg was suddenly invaded by the 
water, and after filling up with a bizarre 
noise, it was ship-wrecked before our very 
eyes. This incident was so extraordinarily 
monni-nrrful to Simone that her body tautened
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and she had a long climax, virtually drinking 
m y  left eye between her lips.”'
But always the ebb and flow of the various energies 
in the text stand in some active relation towards 
one another: all pertain ultimately to the transgreasive 
function of trie text and its language, which is defined
thus:
"But as of then, no doubt existed for me: 1 
did not care for what is known as 1 pleasures 
of the flesh’ because they really are insipid;
I cared only for what is classified, as ’diity .
On the other hand, 1 was not even satisfied 
with the usual debauchery, because the only 
thing it dirties is debauchery itself, while, 
in some way or other, anything sublime and 
perfect is left intact by it. My kind of 
debauchery soils not only my body and my thoughts, 
but also anything 1 may conceive in its course, 
that is to say, the vast starry universe, which 
merely serves as a backdrop.
I ascr yistc the mo on with ttu vagina.’ blood 
of mothers, sisters, that is, the menstrua 
with their sickening stench.
This is the excessive principle at the basis of the 
text which is more of an anti-basis than a foundation, 
for it formulatfs a radical over-reaching, a puny 
collection of words pitting itself against the "vast, 
starry universe", which it desperately wants to 
"soil" and "dirty". Because it over-reaches, the 
text undermines its own demand for excessive trans­
gression, creating a gap that is a potential site 
for affording us jouissance.
However, if we are to take this passage seriously, 
it unsettles the entire text. All the various and
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5. 2_2 T _  the Flow Of 
Con cl us ion
= # W B s  -
Wl11 «x hallucinate whac is ecEiricalli impossible: 
that our t «  profferin£s be made a t ^ J ^  
time: that one dees not follow the o t*.
I T i t  depended on it. Proffering cannot be 
double (doubled): only the sinElc^rasn w l  
do, in which the two forces join (senara e,
= a #
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a movement whose model is socially unknown, 
unthinkable: neither exchange, nor gift, no
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distinguishes the concept from ie flash as used 
in the passage, quoted a chapter ago, from h'empire
des si^nes.
Kloseowski is indicated, together with Baudelaire, 
in the margin of this specific fragment. Although, 
ultimately, everything we have said about these 
wr-'tings by Barthes, on Zen, etc., is grossly in­
accurate due to the fact that we are saying it in 
■nglisb - ie. engaging with both the texts by Barthes 
concepts originally formulated in Japanese - 
by way Of translation, with all the problematic 
transferences of meaning that it en.ails, we ca 
still, be it termed flash, eclair, or satori, discern 
a certain notion that may be defined similarly in 
various languages. Let us therefore quote an Bngaish 
translation extracted from a French text by rierre 
Klossowski wherein he, writing on Slietzsche - who 
wrote in German - also speaks of a type of .satori
or "awakening"i
"The idea of the sternal Return came to^ia.zsJhe
as a sudden awakening, thanks to a ieclinn., 
certain state or tonality of fcind. Initially 
confused with this feeling, the idea itself 
emeiges as a specific doctrine; nonetheless, 
it preserves the character of a revelation - 
a sudden unveiling...
The accent must be placed on the loss of a given 
identity. The 'death of Lod' (of the God who 
guarantees the identity of the accountable 
self) opens the soul to all its possible 
identities, already apprehended through the 
diverse feelings of the Niets.cean soul. The 
revelation of the Eternal Return necessarily 
brings on the successive realisations of all 
possible identities: 'all the names of history,
•i
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finally, are me' - in the end, 'Dionysus and 
the Crucified.' The 'death of God.' then, corres- 
sponds to a feeling in hietzsche in the same 
'way 33 the ecstatic moment of the Eternal Re urn
does."258
rr.
,f the one in ID, it is obvious that both quotations
leal with a comparable process, "a loss of iden y , 
defined in similar terms, an "eclair unique an 
"ecstatic moment of the Eternal Return".
To use the citation from Uossowski as evidence of 
the Kictzschean conceptualisation of the proffering 
of love in M  would amount to very little: Barthes s 
.4olair unique" is not just a synonym for vhlttne 
former circ^cribed as the "Eternal Return", however, 
by juxtaposing the two passages together with our 
earlier remarks on textual desire, which proceeds 
from Deleuse, an equally "Kietzschean" figure, we 
may arrive at a collection Of statements genera 
enough to constitute a conclusion of our readings 
of the theory of pleasure and the amorous discourse.
that is of overriding importance, but the tjLEe_of 
thought taking pi ce in the texts we have been reading, 
utilising as they do theoretically declasse 
in an asvstereatic way. In tnis, ££, «£ anaLU^arer.o 
unique: in the Introduction to the sequel to i^nii-
who inhabits, of course, a uniformly pink space 
n ..4 i -ri nnnt breaks" in moving frow
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one incompletely aelineated spatiality to the nex 
Productivist thought is also self-productive, ahle 
to insinuate itself i | o  any conceptual medium, from 
the rigorous and academically unimpeachable to that 
which is vulgar and compromised in belonging to 
popular culture.
What Ff, RB and ID teach us, therefore, is not the 
latest way to read a text, a model to be studied 
and then "applied", but the heterogeneity not on y 
of all textuality, but of "the world" in the widest 
sense of that wide term. That is not to say that 
these texts do not contain specific theorisations 
of specific domains, on the contrary; this Is borne 
out by our reading. These theorisations are proper y 
to be used in an active, way, ie. in a way that will 
extend and transform them. Whence their aphoristic
form.
Accordingly, they are invitations to engage in text- 
ualisation ourselves. I *  must give free r o m  to our 
desire for texts. The subject-object thinking of 
textuality, as well as the "I buy from you, you give 
me something to read" contract foisted on texts by 
the market mechanism, constitute blockages of the 
flow of textual desire. The fact that these blockages 
are produced and maintained by the machines of social 
power, the repressive and ideological apparati that 
fix identities like capitalists and communists, manual 
and intellectual workers, teachers and children, 
doctors and madmen, policemen and criminals, etc., 
does not make textual pleasure of minor consequence, 
socio-politically speaking. For the known forms of 
social emancipation, most of which advocate an "armed 
struggle" of sorts, depend for their grandiose aliure 
on Simple and hackneyed codes comprising heroism 
and altruism that are ultimately reducible to textual
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repression. It is only within a humanist problematic 
and discourse that more significance is attached 
to the spilling of human blood - other a imals are 
daily herded into abattoirs - than to the spilring 
of ink; ink being a metonym here for textual- pro­
duction, and not an empiricist reduction of textuality 
to, literally, black marks on paper.
By affirming the flow of textual desire, or by
uttering the cliche, "I love you", in the manner of
the lover of LD241, we aspire towards the "absolute
materialism" that, in social or textual terms, is
revolutionary. It will not be the b..oody and gory
revolution that the realistic discourse of the mas:;
media brings to our attention from time to time, and
to the containment of which disciplinary regimes are
so well adapted but, in the words of PT, a "subtle 
242subversion" .
In their fragmented playing with literary theoretical 
concepts, IT, J U  and LB are equally operating a 
theoretically subversive laughter Bniike conven­
tional literary theoretical discourse which sets 
up a metalanguage which is not in itself to be regarded 
and read as a "text", according to the conditions 
and methods for reading that it espouses, ?T, 2% *nd 
LD are as much texts productive of pleasure, jouissance 
and laughter as the erotic text by Bataille that we 
have considered in the previous chapter. To adapt 
Deleuze's famous remark on reading Metzsche , 
to read these texts by Barthes and not to be subverted, 
not to be cast adrift on the flow of pleasure, not to 
join one* s force with that of the text in a singij? 
flash, is not to have read them at all.
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